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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to argue that Mao Zedong 
sought revolutionary immortality, through the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Despite his publicly-stated 
desire to improve China on many fronts, the Cultural 
Revolution had another purpose: the renewal of revolutionary 
fervor that characterized China during the early years of 
Mao's rule, and its essential by-product, the implementation 
of Mao Zedong Thought into everyday life. Mao believed that 
if China could be transformed into his unique vision of 
communism, and if the peoples' revolutionary zeal could be 
sustained and harnessed to modernize the country, the success 
of this unusual methodology would secure his place in 
history. Unfortunately for China and for Mao's dreams, 
factionalization within the Chinese Communist Party and the 
social havoc wreaked by the Red Guard resulted in the rise of 
the moderates, who discarded Mao Zedong Thought for a more 
pragmatic approach to economic reform and modernization. The 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution ignited extremist 
forces that were beyond Mao's control and failed to 
accomplish his real goal of assuring his revolutionary 
immortality.
Introduct ion
Throughout Mao Zedong’s tenure as Chairman of the 
Chinese Communist Party, he struggled to maintain his 
prominence as the leader of China.1 Applying his 
interpretation of Marxism-Leninism to China, Mao formulated 
campaigns designed to incorporate the masses into the 
political process. Mao had always championed the peasants; 
he believed their support was crucial to his maintenance of 
power. But it was Mao’s strict devotion to the masses that 
eventually led to his downfall. After the failure of two of 
his campaigns, the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Great 
Leap Forward, Mao lost much of his political power. This 
thesis will argue that Mao contrived the Great Proletarian 
.Cultural Revolution to regain political power and to assure 
himself revolutionary immortality. It will be maintained 
that in order to accomplish his goal, Mao attempted to remove 
those who opposed his philosophy. The thesis will contend 
that the movement led to a struggle for power between the Mao 
and his supporters and the moderates led by Liu Shaoqi.2
In the first chapter, several aspects of Mao Zedong's
1Biographical information of Mao Zedong is in appendix A. 
Distinction between the structure of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the Chinese government is in appendix B.
2Biographical information of Liu Shaoqi is in appendix
A.
V
political philosophy will be explored, including the 
continuous revolution, the mass line, and "Reds versus 
Experts". The implementation of his ideology will be 
illustrated by examining the circumstances leading to the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Hundred Flowers 
Campaign and the Great Leap Forward will be investigated to 
illustrate the impracticality of Mao Zedong Thought. The 
second chapter will address the full scope of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution, including Mao's 
consolidation of power, the campaign to rejuvenate lost 
revolutionary fervor, the purges of intellectuals and 
capitalists, the rise and fall of the Red Guard, the 
involvement of the Revolutionary Leftists, and the eventual 
decline of the movement with the seizure and trial of the 
Gang of Four. The third chapter will analyze the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution, exploring Mao's campaigns, 
and the rise of two competing factions, the Maoists and the 
moderates, at the begining of the Cultural Revolution. 
Finally, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will be 
reviewed and explained as Mao's attempt to attain 
revolutionary immortality.
Chapter I
Mao Zedong Thought and the Early Campaigns
From 1935 to 1976, the first 40 years of existence of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zedong was the 
principle guide as well as founder.3 Mao devised his own 
adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese model, now 
known as "Mao Zedong thought." In China, Mao has often been 
given the same respect and praise as former emperors, almost 
to the point of deification. During his life, his control 
over the lives of the Chinese people gave him unprecedented 
power. Following such political disasters as the Hundred 
Flowers campaign, the Great Leap Forward, and the Socialist 
Education Movement, which will be explored in greater depth 
later, Mao believed it was essential to reassert the people's 
complete and unquestionable commitment to communism. Despite 
a record of failed indoctrination movements, he announced the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in order to inculcate 
communism to the whole of Chinese society. This campaign 
would be his last massive attempt to indoctrinate the people 
with his ideology and purify the CCP. Mao wanted only devout 
followers of his philosophy in the top leadership of the CCP 
and therefore carried out purges to remove the less zealous 
party members.
3John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800- 
1985 (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 233-34.
2This chapter will argue that the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution was Mao’s attempt to purify the CCP by 
molding it in his own fashion. It will further assert that, 
due to his demand for undeviating adherence to his own 
ideology, the CCP was divided into two main factions: the 
Maoists, who were ideologues, and the pragmatists. The 
Maoists' attempts to gain complete power failed, and after 
197 6, the pragmatists rose to the top leadership positions. 
The Cultural Revolution was a power struggle between Mao and 
the pragmatists; it was a struggle between ideology and 
reality. Mao was unwilling to relinquish power because of 
his desire to attain immortality. He seemed to believe that 
without his leadership, communism would wither and his dreams 
would not be realized. This chapter will conclude that Mao's 
massive campaigns were poorly planned and far too ambitious 
to be implemented effectively.
The philosophy of Mao Zedong must be explored in order 
to understand Mao's quest for immortality, and the way in 
which he used his campaigns to pursue it. There are four 
components of Maoist ideology that will be examined below: 
first, the idea of the Mass Line; second, the continuous 
revolution; third, the contention between "Red" and "Expert"; 
and finally, Mao's campaigns. The balance of this chapter 
will explore these four aspects of Mao Zedong thought and 
conclude by describing their role in the events which led to 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
3The Mass Line
One of the most notable aspects of Mao Zedong's thought
is the concept of the "mass line". Mao believed that the
enormous size of the Chinese population could be viewed as an
asset. In essence, the purpose of the mass line was to
implement Mao's vision of communism at the grass roots level,
the peasants were to be the vanguard of the revolution. It
was a strategy designed to involve the whole of Chinese
society by incorporating the vast population into the
political and economic processes. Mao contended that the
mass line would be the most efficient way to indoctrinate
China's immense population with communism. He saw the
relationship between the people and the party as reciprocal,
not one-sided in which the party alone would formulate and
implement policy without considering the masses. Mao defined
the mass line in 1943:
[A]11 correct leadership is necessarily "from 
the masses, to the masses." This means: take 
the ideas of the masses and through study turn 
them into concentrated and systematic ideas, 
then go to the masses and propagate and 
explain these until the masses embrace them as 
their own, hold fast to them and translate 
them into action, and test the correctness of 
these ideas in the masses and once again go to 
the masses so that the ideas are persevered 
in and carried through. Such is the Marxist
4theory of knowledge.4
Mao contended that the party members could learn from 
the masses and use them to guide the continuous struggle 
towards communism. He believed that by focusing the 
attention of the revolution on the countryside, home to the 
majority of the population, he could achieve communism more 
quickly. However, the peasants could make judgments only on 
their own small scale. It was impossible for them to see 
China as an entire political and economic entity. The farmer 
had access only to his own village, an obviously limiting 
factor. The people were not properly educated in agriculture 
and engineering to be able to form qualified opinions 
concerning public policy. Therefore, the ideas of all the 
peasants must be taken into consideration individually and 
then woven together to create a unified policy which was 
articulated by leaders. Mao relied on the mass line because
he believed it connected him to the countryside where he had
initially won support at the grass roots level during the 
early days of the revolution. He believed that the support 
of the peasantry of China was invaluable for political unity 
and for an efficient system of policy formulation.
Mao maintained that the leadership of the CCP must 
realize the importance of the Mass Line. He argued that the
4Mao Zedong as quoted in Tony Smith,
Thinking Like a Communist (New York: W.& W.
Norton & Co., 1987), 112.
5rural populace should be the focus of the party; that 
peasants represented the backbone of Chinese society, and 
with their support, the CCP would continue to grow and the 
goal of communism could be realized without sacrificing 
legitimacy. In his speech in the summer of 1955, Mao 
stated:
[M]ost of the peasants show enthusiasm for 
taking the socialist road...For them, 
socialism is the only way out. These peasants 
make up 60 or 70 percent of the entire rural 
population....but some of our comrades ignore 
these facts. This means that their eyes are 
on the comparatively small number of well-to-
do peasants to the neglect of the great
majority of the poor peasants. This is one 
kind of wrong thinking.5
Mao also argued that the road towards communism would be
easier because of the nature of the rural populace. He
stated that the people could be molded into communists
because they were "poor and blank". Mao defined this phrase
in a speech in April 1956:
By "poor" I mean that we have not much 
industry and that our agriculture is not so 
very advanced either. By "blank" I mean that 
we are like a sheet of blank paper, since our 
cultural and scientific level is not high.
Those who are poor want change; a blank sheet 
of paper is good for writing on.6
After the speech was printed in the People 's Daily, 
cries of outrage came from people who felt humiliated by such
5Mao Zedong as quoted Ibid., 118.
6Mao Zedong as quoted ibid., 120.
6degrading remarks. Mao failed to take into account the 
tradition of the Chinese people with this "poor and blank" 
speech. He ignored the thousand year history of 
Confucianism, which was deeply ingrained in the culture of 
the peasants. Mao was firm in the belief that because the 
people were "poor and blank," the revolution towards 
communism could be accomplished by a series of wide sweeping 
campaigns. Many people became apprehensive about these 
campaigns and this fostered a suspicion of the government.
To regain the trust of the people, Mao stated it would be 
simpler to realize the goals of communism in a society (such 
as rural China), that does not have a strong capitalist 
foundation (for example Western Europe). In Western Europe, 
capitalism is so strongly entrenched in society that the 
whole economic system would have to be changed in order to 
bring about communism. China, conversely, is not as 
industrially advanced and would not need to destroy an 
existing infrastructure but build the first one in the 
communist design. By constantly gathering and adapting the 
ideas of the peasants and then making the leap to a more 
modern way of life, Mao would implement communism in a more 
efficient manner, without the wide-scale violence and turmoil 
typical of other communist societies like the Soviet Union.
To maintain the level of dedication to communism required by 
the Mass Line, Mao relied on the idea of the continuous 
revolution.
7The poor and blank speech also suggested that China 
might mover rapidly to socialism but only if the party would 
do the "writing" on the "blank sheet of paper.” The speech 
further stated that "most of the peasants show enthusiasm for 
taking the socialist road," and Mao illustrated his faith in 
the masses by adding, "We must have faith in the masses and 
we must have faith in the party. These are two cardinal 
principles. If we doubt these principles, we shall 
accomplish nothing."7
The problem with implementing his ideological goals was 
the party. Mao believed that it was a poor instrument to 
carry out his plan or to do the "writing on the blank sheet 
of paper." He lost further ground with the party because it 
deleted the rule that Mao Zedong Thought was to act as the 
guideline for party policy. In February 1957, he gave a 
speech, "On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions among 
the People." This speech attacked the party as an 
institution responsible for obstructing the revolution and 
that it was the people’s responsibility for rectifying this 
situation.
In this speech, Mao distinguished between "antagonistic 
contradictions" of the sort that existed between the Chinese 
people and those who opposed their revolution, and "non- 
antagonistic contradictions" of the kind that would occur
7Mao Zedong as quoted in ibid, 120.
8within the people's democratic dictatorship, that is, among
the friends of the revolution. Mao stated that:
[T]here are still certain contradictions 
between the government and the people. These 
include contradictions among the interests of 
the state, the interests of the collective, 
and the interests of the individual; between 
democracy and centralism; between the 
leadership and the led; and the contradiction 
arising from the bureaucratic style of work of 
certain government workers in their relations 
with the masses.8
Mao stated that the contradictions of the goals of the 
party and of the people would not facilitate progress for 
China. Thus, he believed that these contradictions were 
impeding the movement towards modernization, 
industrialization and collectivization; in short, these 
contradictions were standing in the way of the continuous 
revolution.
The Continuous Revolution
For at least the first decade after the Communists 
assumed control of China from the nationalist Guomindang 
(KMT),8 the CCP could claim that there was a legitimate 
revolution, one in which the people genuinely authorized the 
exercise of political power to bring about social change to a
8Mao Zedong as quoted in ibid, 121.
9The KMT is derived from the Wade-Giles spelling of 
Guomindang which is spelled Kuomintang.
9popularly supported regime. Therefore, the leadership of the 
Chinese Communist revolution during its first decade was both 
legitimate and revolutionary. The CCP gained support from 
all social classes during the Chinese National Revolution in 
which they seized power from the KMT. The peasants followed 
Communist leadership because of the party’s resistance to the 
invading imperialist Japanese army, and because the CCP 
treated the peasants with dignity and respect when they 
needed to use their land, unlike the KMT who would not pay 
for items used in the struggle against the Japanese.
Students supported the party's cause because it clearly 
advocated Chinese nationalism, and many college-age men and 
women joined the Communist army in response to the call to 
chiu-kuo (save the nation). Further, a significant 
proportion of the urban and commercial groups came to support 
the party during the civil war because of their belief or 
hope that the Communists might have solutions to China's 
numerous economic problems. In their eyes, the Communists 
were preferable to the Guomindang because the KMT had largely 
discredited itself through corruption, inefficiency and 
brutality. The educated and intellectual elites also backed 
the CCP for all of the above reasons, and because they had 
accepted fragments of Marxist-Leninism ideology since the May
1 0
Fourth movement in 1919.10
After the first decade of CCP rule, the revolution began 
to lose its legitimacy. The road to communism must have 
seemed very long and slow. The people, and perhaps some 
leaders as well, became impatient with the CCP. Mao believed 
that because of the growing dissatisfaction, the struggle 
towards "true communism" had to be revitalized. Therefore, 
Mao asserted to the CCP that steps must be taken to reawaken 
the people's commitment to communism.n The period after 1956 
marked his preoccupation with implementing the continuous 
revolution by stimulating grass roots political action and he 
focused on the ideology of the CCP in this period more than 
ever before. Chalmers Johnson argues that a partial 
explanation of Mao's growing immersion in ideology after 1956 
was the unprecedented international problems which demanded 
careful ideological explanation. Khrushchev's anti-Stalin 
revelations and the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution, 
were probably influential in Mao's decision to re-examine his 
own ideological stance. Once started on a deceptively easy- 
looking path, he found himself committed to ideological 
positions upon which he subsequently had to act, and the
iQChalmers Johnson, "The Two Chinese Revolutions," China 
Quarterly 39(July-September 1969): 13-14. For more
information on the May Forth movement see pp. 12-15.
11Maurice Meisner "Utopian Goals and Ascetic Values in 
Chinese Communist Ideology," Journal of Asian Studies 
2 8 (November, 1968): 104.
11
whole process began to escalate in a way that has yet to end.12 
Mao was no longer concerned with applying the USSR's version 
of Marxism-Leninism to China, a vastly underdeveloped country 
both politically and economically, but rather formulated 
large-scale plans to convert China into his version of a 
true, communist state. He believed that taking such an 
ambitious approach to the conversion to communism was 
consistent with, and even required by, the size of the 
country and the circumstances in which he found it . To 
indoctrinate a country like China to a radically new way of
life, all-inclusive campaigns had to be employed. Thus, the
people must be committed to the changes or, in Mao's words, 
must be committed to the continuous revolution. Mao rejected 
the notion that social change can be tightly controlled or
directed from above, a notion he saw exemplified in the
Soviet model. Rather, he believed that the development and 
resolution of contradictions in society and social progress 
came about through the interaction of social forces, through 
the reciprocal interaction between the elites and the 
peasants.13
Mao wanted to move ahead towards Communism in large, 
incremental steps. These steps were to be his mass campaigns
12johnson., p.22.
13Graham Young and Dennis Woodward, "Uninterrupted 
Revolution and Continuous Revolution," Asian Survey 
1 8 (September 1978): 918.
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to change the country from a feudal to Communist society.
To guide China through the difficult transition, Mao 
envisioned the exemplary worker, someone who not only would be 
a good communist with a tenacious belief in the goals and 
life style appropriate to a true Marxist-Leninist, but also 
would possess the skills and abilities to implement these 
goals using technical knowledge. Mao stated that this person 
would be both "Red", for his commitment to communism, and 
"Expert", for the technical skills to implement the goals of 
communism.
Red and Expert
One of the changes in society that Mao stressed was the 
de-emphasis of social and economic class. He wanted Chinese 
society to be completely egalitarian and homogeneous and he 
explained his interpretation of utopian society in his 
identification of the "Red and Expert." The red and expert 
notion combined Marxist utopianism with several other 
characteristics of the Chinese Communist mentality. Ideally, 
the "red and expert" exemplified not only the social values 
and norms of the present, but also the Communist goals of the 
future. Maurice Meisner states that the red and expert 
archetype was conceived as the product of existing socialist 
society and the exemplar of the ascetic lifestyle necessary 
in the present. He was also the symbol of a more advanced
1 3
"communist consciousness," and thus the producer of the 
broader social goals of the Marxist vision of the future. As 
characteristically described, the red and expert worker was 
to be the model for a new generation of all-around man who is 
a "jack of all trades," capable of engaging in scientific 
tasks, cultural undertakings, and physical labor. He is a 
pillar of communist social and moral values. He is not a 
slave to the past, and has the capability and freedom to be 
creative and to break the bonds of tradition. The red and 
expert laborer could handle both civilian and military work; 
he could combine communist theory with practical work, and 
would be capable of switching from one job to another as the 
needs of society dictated. In short, he would be the new 
breed of Communist man, both red and expert, who was to 
realize Mao Zedong's vision of a whole nation of socialist­
conscious, cultured laborers.14
Although, in theory, the vision of the red and expert 
may have seemed feasible to Mao, in practice such a goal was 
far from possible. China simply did not have the industrial 
or the educational capability to produce such people. There 
were many Reds who carried out the party line and obeyed 
Maoist thought. There were also Experts who had technical 
knowledge, but who were too pragmatic and unwilling to 
capitulate and implement communist ideology in the
^Meisner., p.106.
14
industries. As previously stated, the vast majority of the 
Chinese population were peasants who had little access to 
education to attain the technical knowledge required to be 
truly red and expert. The contradiction between the reds and 
the experts led to a great many problems for China, 
politically, technologically, and economically. Examples of 
the downfall of the red and expert were quite evident in the 
campaigns initiated by Mao. One of the clearest examples of 
the difficulty inherent in the red and expert theory was the 
Great Leap Forward, one of several campaigns to be explored 
in further detail.
The Campaigns
The next section will explore the campaigns that 
preceded the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; these 
will include the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the Great Leap 
Forward, the Commune System, the Great Leap in Industry, and 
the Socialist Education Movement and Mao-Study Campaign.
In order for Mao's ideology to be proved correct and 
workable it had to be implemented in practicle situations. 
Thus to legitimize his ideas he set out to incorporate the 
masses in his political campaigns. Mao beleived that, the 
people's will should be known not so that government can 
reflect this opinion but so that the state can better 
implement its programs. In an attempt to merge his theory
1 5
with practice, Mao stated in 1962:
Everyone knows that if a factory has no raw 
material it cannot do any processing. If the 
raw material is not adequate in quantity and 
quality it cannot produce good finished 
products. Without democracy, you have no 
understanding of what is happening down below; 
the situation will be unclear; you will be 
unable to collect sufficient opinions from all 
sides; there can be no communication between 
top and bottom, is
In order to over come his adversaries in the party, he 
appealed to alternate sources to give his policies 
legitimacy. Two of the main groups Mao turned to were the 
peasants and the intellectuals.
His first major campaign was the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign. This two-year campaign was initiated in 1956.
Mao's gambit was to appeal for popular criticism of the party 
under the slogan, "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred 
schools of thought contend."16 Mao contended that the party 
could be strengthened by criticism from non-party members.
Lu Dingyi, director of the party's Propaganda Department, 
asserted:
We still have enemies, and the class struggle 
is still going on inside the country. But our 
enemies inside the country in particular, have 
had their teeth drawn... We must keep up a 
relentless struggle against them; we must not
15Mao Zedong as quoted in Smith, 135.
16Smith, 121.
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relax our efforts.17
Lu interpreted Mao's statement of "Let a hundred flowers 
bloom", to concern writers and artists, and "Let a hundred 
schools of thought contend", to apply to scientists. He 
argued that the reason for the policy was that the country 
needed art, literature, and science, to be prosperous and 
strong in order to promote the independent thinking, debate, 
and creative work which would guide China into the future.18 
When he first presented the idea of the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign, other top party officials urged Mao not to engage 
in this campaign because they believed it would result in 
mass dissension rather than positive criticism of the party 
philosophy. Despite these warnings, Mao persisted and the 
campaign was initiated in May of 1956.
The Hundred Flowers Campaign was a new phase for the 
party, and part of a general improvement in the working 
conditions of the intellectuals. They were given access to 
foreign publications, as well as more free time and scope for 
incentive to work within the system. Zhou Enlai stated, "The 
overwhelming majority of the intellectuals have become 
government workers in the service of Socialism and are
17Biographical information for Lu Dingyi 
in appendix A. Lu Dingyi as quoted by 
Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the 
Cultural Revolution (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1974), 93.
18Ibid., 53-54.
17
already part of the working-class... a fundamental change has
taken place among Chinese intellectuals in the past six
years".19 Mao urged the intellectuals to voice criticisms of
the cadres who had been watching over them. He argued:
Most of our intellectuals have made marked 
progress during the past seven years. They 
express themselves in favor of the socialist 
system. Many of them are diligently studying 
Marxism, and some have become Communists....
There are, of course, still some intellectuals 
who are skeptical of socialism or who do not 
approve of it, but they are in a minority. 2°
John King Fairbank asserts that Mao estimated that among
a total of, at most, five million intellectuals (i.e., middle-
school graduates and above), not more than 3 percent were by
this time hostile to Marxism. Therefore, he believed that
the Hundred Flowers criticism of the CCP's bureaucratic style
and methods would be constructive, representing a "non-
antagonistic contradiction" among the people, and arguable
within a context of complete loyalty to the Communist
system.21
At first the intellectuals were reluctant to criticize
the party because they believed that if they dared to attack
the CCP, they would be in danger of retribution. Therefore,
for the first year the intellectuals were silent. In May of
19Biographical information for Zhou Enlai in appendix A. 
Ibid., p .93.
20ibid.
2lFairbank, 293.
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1957, one year after Mao had urged them to criticize the 
party, the CCP launched a campaign to criticize the 
performance of the party bureaucracy. Once the cadres came 
under attack, the intellectuals who had suffered under them 
unleashed a widespread barrage of criticism. The 
intellectuals rebuked the party in rapidly escalating terms, 
with its basic premises, working style, doctrines, and 
practices suddenly coming under attack. The criticisms were 
so severe that within five weeks, the Hundred Flowers 
campaign had to be halted.22
Non-party members criticized the CCP for the 
dictatorship of the single party system. The attacks on the 
party came from both workers and intellectuals. Strikes and 
protests resulted from the campaign, as the Chinese people 
voiced their differences with the CCP. The party leaders 
soon realized that the Hundred Flowers Campaign had led to 
social unrest, and they took steps to end the criticism 
quickly. In June 1957, the CCP signaled an abrupt shift from 
liberalism to an anticapitalist campaign. Zhou Enlai warned 
non-Communist leaders they would be labeled class enemies if 
they continued their outspoken criticism of the party.23
The Hundred Flowers Campaign ended with widespread
22Ibid.
23Byung-Joon Ahn, Chinese Politics and the Cultural 
Revolution (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976),
21 .
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investigation of intellectuals, regardless of the extent of 
their participation in the criticism. The campaign also 
brought internal tensions to the CCP. Many top party leaders 
were opposed to the campaign from the beginning, and once it 
proved to be a failure, the tensions g r e w . 24
Chalmers Johnson maintains that although the Hundred 
Flowers episode did not do serious damage to the party's 
authority, it appears to have inspired in Mao an ideological 
recklessness that had been absent throughout the earlier part 
of his career. The Hundred Flowers Campaign marks the 
beginning of the divergence of two belief systems, that of 
the communist revolution and Mao's personal ideology, a 
divergence that appears today to have undone much of what had 
been accomplished up to that time.25
After the Hundred Flowers Campaign, Mao wanted to 
implement a program of rapid communization and 
industrialization. Just as he had done in the previous 
campaign, he turned away from the party leaders and went to 
the masses to implement his new means of industrialization 
and communization. Mao wanted China to become a leading 
economic power; he wanted to surpass the West and contended 
that it was an obtainable goal. In his vision, the solution
24Tony Saich, China: Politics and Government. (New
York: St Martin's Press, 1981), 33, 174.
25ibid.
20
of the economic problems in China was to incorporate the idea
of the mass line. He believed that a politically strong
regime, utilizing the concepts of Marxism-Leninism, could 
solve any economic problem with previously unseen efficiency. 
Thus, China would be viewed by the rest of the world as a 
model to other nations for the speed of its economic 
development.26
His next campaign, the Great Leap Forward, had two main 
stages: first, the institution of the commune system, and 
second, the great leap in industry.
The change to the commune system took place mainly in
the countryside in the guise of rural land reform. Mao
fervently believed that if the peasants followed his 
directives substantial industrial and agricultural progress 
could be made without the aid of farm machinery such as 
tractors and combines. With China's vast population, he 
believed that the goals of the commune system could be 
implemented more efficiently than with machinery. The 
communes' essential principle was to combine several 
cooperatives into a commune. The work would be distributed 
from the central planning body of the commune. The purpose 
system was, first, to indoctrinate the peasants of China in 
the ways of communism, and second, to collectivize farm land
26Peter S.H. Tang and Joan M. Maloney, Communist China 
The Domestic Scene 1949-1967. (South Orange, N J : Seton Hall 
University Press, 1967), 373.
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in the endeavor to make a more proficient agricultural 
process. The inhabitants of the communes were to work, eat, 
and sleep together, in addition to renouncing all private 
possessions,27
In theory, Mao believed that the commune system would be 
the most efficient way to inculcate the practice of communism 
into the people of the countryside. C.P. FitzGerald argues 
that the campaign was carried out in a manner that made 
failure inevitable. The workers performed their tasks 
without questioning the policy of the central authorities. 
There was a severe lack of communication between the workers 
and the cadres who devised the work schedules, which resulted 
in mismanagement and miscalculations of the actual production 
of the communes. Men had to be moved to unfamiliar farms, 
local knowledge and skills were not acknowledged, and the 
advice of experienced farmers was not respected by untrained 
cadres, who were ignorant of proper agricultural techniques. 
Because the new program forced the peasants to work land with 
which they were unfamiliar, they did not feel compelled to 
point out possible dangers of the cadres' method. As a 
result of the unwillingness of the cadres to listen to the 
peasants, as well as the farmers failure to inform them of 
possible hazards to their method of cultivation, the crops 
were often below average and the cadres were not very
27C.P. FitzGerald, Mao Tse-Tung and China (New York: 
 ^cflolmes & Meir Publishers, Inc., 1976), 95-96.
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accurate in their assessments of the yield. In fact, they 
grossly exaggerated successes and covered up - f a i l u r e s . 28
The effects of the miscalculations were staggering. 
Natural disasters such as floods and droughts were blamed for 
the food shortages, instead of human errors. To combat these 
natural calamities, by order of the Central Committee and the 
State Council, some sixty million people were mobilized for 
crash programs in seventeen of the provinces, to help salvage 
the crops. By 1960, the agricultural situation was critical. 
More than half of the arable land, according to the New China 
News Agency dispatch of December 30, 1960, was affected by 
drought or flood conditions; some areas became absolutely 
nonproductive.29 Severe shortages and rationing of food 
resulted from the cadres' inefficient management of the 
droughts and floods. The people had to endure great 
hardships in most of the rural areas because of the mistakes 
of the governmental officials.30
The second goal of the Great Leap Forward was to bring 
about significant advances in industry in an ambitious 
attempt to increase China's industrial production to match 
that of Great Britain. In the course of the Great Leap 
Forward, Mao again turned away from the party leaders and
28ibid., 97-98.
29Tang & Maloney., p. 399. 
30Ibid.
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went to the masses to implement his campaign just as he had 
done in the Hundred Flowers Campaign. He believed that if 
the enthusiasm of the people could be put to work in 
industries and farms, the campaign would flourish. Although 
there was still skepticism on the part of the leaders, they 
exhibited more confidence in this campaign than they had done 
with the Hundred Flowers.
The Great Leap Forward was initiated in 1958 and 
signified vast changes in economic policies of the CCP.
Until that time Soviet influence had dominated the CCP but 
the new policy symbolized one of the first major steps away 
from Soviet influence and towards Chinese independence.31 Mao 
wanted China to be more self reliant. He saw the country far 
behind the West in terms of industrial development, and 
wanted to modernize as quickly as possible. However, his 
ambitious vision led to ever greater economic difficulty.
In the first year of the campaign, it appeared that the 
Great Leap Forward would be a success: industrial and
agricultural production increased. The downfall began when 
the Soviets withdrew their support from China's industry, 
leaving a technical void. The Soviets had intended to make 
China a satellite country by devising all its technical, 
economic, and political strategies, but the Chinese had no 
intention of compromising their autonomy to outsiders. The
31James R. Townsend, Politics in China (Boston: Little, 
Brown & Company, 1974), 114.
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incessant struggle between the two interpretations of 
communism finally led to a complete break in relations 
between the two nations.32 Chinese workers simply did not 
have the technical expertise the Soviets had provided and 
there were other developments which also contributed to the 
failure of the campaign. Industries began to decline as a 
result of the lack of raw materials, mismanagement and the 
inability of the country to produce quality goods. By 1960, 
China was in a serious economic predicament.33
Mao was directly denounced by top party officials for 
the failure of the campaign. One of the main critics was 
Defense Minister, Peng Dehuai, who condemned Mao for trying 
to implement the Great Leap Forward too rapidly, and for 
setting unattainable goals.34 Peng was purged from the CCP 
and replaced.35
The failure of the campaign to bring about the positive 
economic changes that Mao forecast caused other struggles 
within the party. Factions appeared, and with the failure of 
the Great Leap, Mao lost a great deal of his influence over 
the CCP. As a result of the poor economic conditions from 
the Great Leap Forward debacle, the people were poverty
32Ibid., 112, 120-23.
33Saich., p . 38 .
34Biographical information on Peng Dehuai in appendix a.
35Ahn., p. 40-44.
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stricken with an estimated 10 to 20 million famine-related 
deaths, and Mao suffered politically and no longer enjoyed 
majority support in the party or Central Committee.36
The CCP signified its independence from Mao by rejecting
the strategy of the Great Leap and beginning a policy of
economic recovery. The moderates, who wanted a more 
pragmatic and less ideological approach to China's economic 
and political problems, included economic administrators, 
technocrats and specialists.37 He faced strong opposition 
from pragmatists led by Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, who 
wanted the party to be the focus of policy implementation and 
participation in a more pragmatic manner and opposed Mao's 
mass line approach.38 However, although he lost a good deal 
of support, Mao was always at the forefront of the party.
Mao regained popularity in the CCP when he addressed the
Tenth plenum of the Eighth Central Committee in 1962,
stressing the importance of democracy and mass line 
participation. Mao's difference of opinion with the 
pragmatists led to his final major campaign, the Great
36Townsend., p. 123-26. Meisner., 250.
37A.Doak Barnett, China After Mao (Princeton, N J : 
Princeton University Press, 1969), 23.
38Biographical information for Deng Xiaoping in appendix
a .
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Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 39
Another of Mao's campaigns which was taking place 
concurrently with the Great Leap Forward was the Socialist 
Education Movement. This movement originally focused on the 
rural peasants but later incorporated the city factory 
workers, intellectuals, and party cadres. In 1964, it was 
initiated shortly following the Tenth Plenary session of the 
Eighth Central Committee. The theme of the campaign was to 
inform the peasants of the struggle between the socialists 
and the capitalists. In essence, the movement was outlined 
in terms of the class struggle as an inevitable circumstance 
of socialist development.40 Mao stated in his communique of 
the Tenth Plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party that the road to socialism was 
very long and filled with obstacles to block the progression 
to the final goal. Therefore, the people must be educated to 
remain faithful to the movement.41
Subsequently, Mao developed the Socialist Education 
Movement two years after the Tenth Plenary session of the 
Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in
39Saich. , p . 44 .
40Gargi Dutt & V.P. Dutt, China's Cultural Revolution. 
(New York: Asia Publishing House, 1970),21.
41Communique of the Tenth Plenary session of the Eighth 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, "New China 
News Agency, Beijing", 28 September 19 62.
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1 9 6 4 . 42 The goals of this mass education movement were 
defined as the use of proletarian ideology to educate and 
remold the peasants, promote closer relations between the 
cadres and the masses, overcome and prevent erosion by 
capitalist ideology, "expose and smash the various plots of 
sabotage by the class enemies," and consolidate the 
collective economy. The socialist education campaign also 
came to be known as the "four clean-up" movement. The four 
realms to be "cleaned up" were politics, ideology, 
organization, and economy.43
The target of the campaign was the village cadres who 
appeared to be straying away from the goals of the socialist 
movement. Mao insisted that committee chairmen, secretaries, 
accountants, warehousemen, and other village managers had 
become corrupt and had exploited the peasants. They took 
bribes, did less manual labor than others, and ordered the 
people to perform tasks for their own ends, making their own 
lives better while the peasants gained nothing in return.44 
There were severe repercussions as a result of the corruption 
of the cadres. Mao contended that the cadres were guilty of
42The Party was only willing to engage the campaign on a 
small scale where as Mao wanted a much larger effort. 
Fairbank, 308.
43Dutt, 22.
44Fairbank, 308.
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a grievous deviation from socialist ideals.45
In order to rectify the situation Mao sent in outside 
cadres to replace the local officials. The new cadres 
settled in the village for several weeks. While there, they 
cultivated relations with the peasants who had grievances 
against the corrupt cadres. The officials compiled charges 
and evidence against the local cadres, and proceeded to use 
endless interrogation, physical exhaustion, and forced 
confessions as a basis for their verdicts. At the 
commencement of the Socialist Education Movement, the cadres 
retained a great deal of individual control over their 
jurisdictions and Mao's initial goal, to convince the 
peasantry of the rightness of the communist path, was 
eclipsed by the tenacity of the cadres. Liu Shaoqi and Peng 
Zhen had probably foreseen that this would be the result and 
had been more willing to accommodate Mao on this campaign.46
To reassert leadership of the countryside, Mao announced 
that the state would clamp down on the free market.47 This 
decree was not looked upon favorably by the peasants. In 
order to placate the people, the Central Committee announced 
that there would be greater investment in agriculture. The
45MacFarquhar, 2 95-2 96.
46Biographical information for Peng Zhen in appendix a.
Ibid.
47Ezra Vogel, Canton Under Communism, (Cambridge, Mass. 
Harvard University Press, 1969), 204-205.
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Great Leap Forward policy had favored industrial development 
and neglected the growth of the agrarian sector. It was 
hoped that this equalization would in turn stimulate 
industrial production. Mao had earlier asserted that more 
investment in light industry and agriculture would help heavy 
industry, by accumulating more capital faster, which would 
benefit the nation's standard of l i v i n g . 48
Once the Socialist Education Movement was well under way 
the next phase of operation was incorporated. This step was 
an active acceleration of indoctrination of the entire nation 
in the Mao Zedong's thought, outlined above. A Mao-study 
movement was broadened from the ranks of the army to embody 
the whole country. The campaign unfolded through out China. 
For example, in the province of Liaoning, 70,000 
organizations were set up for promoting the Mao-study 
program. To learn the thought of Mao Zedong became a 
compulsion for workers, peasants, intellectuals, and even 
cadres. Mao-study was described as the sole method for every 
one, every unit, and every department to become more 
revolutionary.49
Mao's ideology was expected to change the spiritual 
outlook of the masses in the direction set forth by the 
Chairman. Mao hoped that this exaltation of the movement
48Mao's view on light industry was not shared by the 
majority of the Central Committee. MarFarquhar, 297.
49Dutt, 23.
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would enable him to propel the country to a higher level of 
collectivization, which in essence was the Maoist line.
Thus, it would diminish any opposition to his policies. The 
idolization of Mao would automatically shut out any criticism 
aimed at him by his political rivals.50 This deification of 
Mao also had the ultimate objective of him irreproachable and 
omniscient. It would be inconceivable that after all this 
glorification, anyone could pose a direct challenge to his 
authority; his word was law.51
It is extremely important to note that there was a 
change in direction for the Socialist movement after this 
aspect of the campaign was implemented. As a newly emerging 
communist country, China needed direction and strong 
leadership. Mao may have advocated this goal through his 
speeches and the rhetoric of his campaigns, but behind this 
facade some have seen a more suitable explanation of his 
initiatives. Robert J. Lifton contends that Mao's quest for 
revolutionary immortality compelled him to initiate the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Revolutionary immortality is 
defined by Lifton as a sense of participating in permanent 
revolutionary fermentation, and of transcending individual 
death by "living on" indefinitely within this continuing 
revolution. From this point of view, the sense of
50Dutt, 24.
51Ibid.
immortality is much more than a mere denial of death; it is 
part of compelling, life-enhancing imagery binding each 
individual person to significant groups and events removed 
from him in place and time. It is the individual's inner 
perception of his involvement in what we might call the 
historical process. The sense of immortality may be 
expressed biologically, by living on through one's sons and 
daughters and their sons and daughters; theologically, in the 
idea of a life after death or of other forms of spiritual 
conquest of death; creatively, through "works" and influences 
persisting beyond biological death; through identification 
with nature, and with its infinite extension into time and 
space; or experientially, through a feeling-state, that of 
experiential transcendence, so intense that, at least 
temporarily, it eliminates time and death. What all this 
suggests is that the essence of the "power struggles," is 
power over death.52
52Robert J. Lifton, Revolutionary Immortal-ity. (New York 
Random House: 1968) 7-8.
Chapter II
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
Ostensibly, the purpose of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution was to rekindle the revolutionary spirit 
of the early days of the Chinese communist movement. It was 
also an attempt to reinstate Maoist policies within the 
party, and test the loyalty of central officials. The 
campaign brought purges of the central leadership, especially 
of intellectuals and those in charge of propaganda and 
cultural expression. Widespread attacks were made by the Red 
Guard, groups of fanatic youths sanctioned by Mao in an 
attempt to rejuvenate revolutionary spirit. The campaign 
exploded into mass demonstrations that disrupted society and 
eventually degenerated into a program of terror directed at 
anyone suspected of anti-Mao sentiments; it resulted in 
violent struggles between the Maoists and the moderates. 
Eventually, even the Red Guard divided into rival factions 
and lost much of its power, leading to the rise of the 
"revolutionary rebels," groups of workers who tried to seize 
power from outside the party structure. They too, divided
33
into different factions, which resulted in their demise.53
This second chapter will explore six facets of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution; first, the origin of the 
Cultural Revolution; second, the purges, criticism and anti­
western campaign; third, the role of the Red Guard; fourth, 
the Rise of the Revolutionary Left; fifth, the Role of the 
People's Liberation Army; and finally, the Thermidor of the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.54 This chapter will 
argue that the essence of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution was Mao's attempt to regain the power that he had 
lost as a result of his failures in the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign and the Great Leap Forward. It will also maintain 
that the Cultural Revolution was an ideological struggle 
between the Maoists and the pragmatists. Additionally, it 
will argue that Mao’s final struggle for power left China in 
grave political turmoil without a clearly united party or 
Government.
53The notes for the background of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution were taken from the following sources: 
Byung-Joon Ahn, Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution. 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 197 6),238-242. Tony 
Saich, China: Politics and Government. (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1981),45-71. James R. Townsend, Politics of 
China. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1974), 128-140.
54For a brief explanation of the concept of the 
thermador as a phase of revolutions, see note 103, below.
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The Origin of fche Cultural Revolution
At the end of Mao's previous campaign, the Great Leap 
Forward, the country lay in economic turmoil and party 
leaders blamed Mao for the failure. He had lost a 
considerable amount of his political influence over the CCP 
and withdrew from the mainstream of politics by giving up the 
Chairmanship of the People's Republic and the public eye, 
while retaining party prominence as Chairman of the party. 
More pragmatic leaders, such as Liu Shaoqi, party vice- 
chairman and head of state, and Deng Xiaoping, secretary- 
general of the party, gained more control of the CCP. In 
this period, it appeared that Mao's authority had diminished 
to the point that party leaders practically ignored Mao's 
precepts. The party reasserted its authority, and leaders 
committed to the pragmatism of the period before the Great 
Leap returned to prominence.55 As a result, China's economic 
performance improved greatly.56 Mao retreated to his country 
home in the Yangtze valley and left the government and the
55Liu Shaoqi became the formal head of state of the 
People's Republic, the senior vice-chairman of the Party;
Deng Xiaoping asended to the position of Secretary-General of 
the Party. They were accompanied by the restoration of the 
authority of leading Party bureaucrats such as Lu Dingyi,
Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing; and the economic planners who had 
been the architects of the First Five Year Plan, such as Chen 
Yun, Li Fuchun and Bo Ibo. All had been critical of the 
policies of the Great Leap and they preoceeded to dismantle 
those policies and to return China to a condition of 
"normalcy."
56Tony Smith, Thinking Like a Communist. (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1987), 126.
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party in the hands of Liu Shaoqi. He had appeared to have 
withdrawn from public life. In all probability, he was 
planning his next campaign.
Jules Archer states that control of the party had 
gradually passed into the hands of pragmatic administrators 
and technicians who claimed devotion to Maoist thought, while 
systematically ignoring its principles. It was Liu Shaoqi 
and his supporters in the Central Committee who ran the 
infrastructure of the CCP, the labor unions, the party 
schools and cadre organizations in Mao's name.57 Tang Tsou 
characterizes Liu's interpretation of the mass line as being 
a leader-follower relationship between the people and the 
party. Unlike Mao, Liu regarded his role in the party as 
paternalistic. In his view, the people would respect the 
judgment of the government because they were convinced it was 
acting in their best interests and for the benefit of China. 
Liu's pragmatic explication of the function of the CCP with 
respect to the mass line was in striking contrast to that of 
Mao, who appealed directly to the masses and their sense of 
dignity, power, and importance within the party structure, 
and to their tenacious devotion to an omniscient figure.58
Mao saw his idea of the continuous revolution fading
5?Jules Archer, Mao Tse-Tuncr. (New York: Hawthorn Books, 
Inc.,1972), 169.
58Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao 
Reforms. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986),
74 .
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with the transition to this new order. He contended that the 
current leadership was ignoring his vision for China and was 
introducing corrupt Western capitalist ideas into party 
ideology. This contention compelled him to take action. He 
decided to initiate a campaign to test the dedication of 
party members to continuous revolution, and to purge the 
nation of foreign influences.
Rumors of Mao's failing health spread throughout the 
country and to counter these unfounded stories, Mao announced 
to the press that he was going to swim the Yangtze River at 
Wuhan. The Yangtze is regarded by the Chinese who live by 
it, or on it, as a death trap for those who fall into its 
waters. The swim in the Yangtze served to publicize the fact 
that Mao was still a vibrant leader who was physically fit to 
withstand the pressure and stress of being the Chairman of 
the CCP.59 The swim symbolized Mao's readiness to return to 
the forefront of politics.
Because there were few people he could trust, Mao 
enlisted the help of his wife, Jiang Qing, and long time 
friend Lin Biao to devise and implement the campaign to 
purify the party.60 In the summer of 1966, Mao had given 
Jiang Qing a position on the CCP Central Committee, and by 
autumn she was in charge of organizing a new "cultural
59C.P. FitzGerald, Mao Tse-Tung and China, (New York:
Holes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1976), 114-115.
60Biograhpical information for Jiang Qing in appendix A.
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revolution" as one of Lin's deputies. Her task was to 
"reform" Chinese music, opera, and art by bringing 
practitioners of those arts in line with Maoist thought. She 
spoke on Radio Beijing to denounce rock music, jazz, 
impressionism, and abstract art as counter-revolutionary 
western lures "intended to poison and paralyze the minds of 
the people."61 Mao wanted the people to take pride in their 
own culture and discover its superiority to Western ideas. 
Through Chinese culture, he argued, the people could find the 
true path of the continuous revolution which would lead 
eventually to Chinese communism.
Mao's fundamental purpose in launching the Cultural 
Revolution was to seek out and destroy opponents within the 
party and government who, he contended, were infected with 
debauched Western ideas, which included owning Western made 
products, and to replace them with loyal and dedicated 
supporters.62 In the "Circular of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China," 16 May 1966 Mao said, "There 
is no construction without destruction...Destruction means 
criticism and repudiation, it means revolution. It involves 
reasoning things out, which is construction. Put destruction
61Ibid, 170.
62Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution: The 
Struggle to Consolidate Power," China Quarterly 41 (January- 
March, 1970):1.
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first, and in the process you have construction."63 a s the 
quotation suggests, Mao expected that the Cultural Revolution 
would identify his enemies. Once the counter-revolutionaries 
had been distinguished from the loyal followers of Mao, they 
would be removed from the party and replaced with true 
supporters of the Revolution.64
To carry out the anti-Western campaign, Mao recruited 
millions of college and secondary school-aged youths.
Because his leadership had largely been discredited following 
the Great Leap Forward, he needed a new power base. He 
asserted that the youth of China had never known the 
hardships of life under imperialism, fought a war, or 
experienced the exhilaration of making sacrifices for the 
revolution. Simply reading about history, or hearing about 
it from parents, was a poor substitute for the real thing. 
Without proper guidance, Chinese youth could easily be 
corrupted into following a counterrevolutionary path. 
Therefore, in order to maintain the commitment of the young 
to the continuous revolution, Mao sent hundreds of thousands 
of students to village communes to work with the peasants to 
give them first-hand experience of what it meant to be 
committed to the revolution. The revolutionary youths were
63Ibid.
64Ibid. Mao's enemies were defined as those who had been 
corrupted by Western-bourgeoisie ideals. This definition was 
interpreted very broadly; it will be explained in greater 
detail below.
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given the name of the Red Guards.65 Numbering over two 
million, they were soon to strike fear into the hearts of the 
Chinese people. It appeared that no one was immune from 
their terror.
Purges I Criticism and Anti-Western Campaign
Mao charged several members of the CCP with possessing 
Western views of politics as well as having Western made 
products, which he considered to be treasonous. The first to 
be officially charged with anti-revolutionary ideas was the 
Mayor of Beijing, Peng Zhen. Early in 1960, Wu Han, a well 
known Peking intellectual and writer, a member of the CCP and 
at that time Vice Mayor of Peking, wrote a play entitled "The 
Dismissal of Hai Rui."66 The play was denounced by Yao 
Wenyuan, a minor literary critic, a as a covert attack upon 
Mao. The drama was set during the Ming dynasty and 
celebrated the heroism of a virtuous official deposed by a 
tyrannical emperor for having protested the seizure of 
peasant lands by rapacious landlords and corrupt 
bureaucrats.67 C.P. FitzGerald argues that the fact that this
65The role the Red Guard will be explored below; see pp. 
46-52.
66Bioghaphical information for Wu Han in appendix A.
67Meisner, 330.
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play was published and performed gave the signal for the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to begin; those who 
tolerated it were singled out by Mao as his opponents to be 
purged. The author of the play was a close comrade of Peng 
Zhen, who was himself a devoted friend of Liu Shaoqi. An 
attack on Wu Han was, in essence, therefore, an attack on the 
leadership of the CCP in general, and on Liu Shaoqi in 
particular.68 The purge of Peng Zhen sent a message to top 
officials that Mao still retained power, and that they must 
conform to a strict Maoist line if they wanted to remain in 
power. The removal of a relatively low level leader 
symbolized the commencement of the power struggle between the 
Maoists and the pragmatists, led by Liu Shaoqi, which was to 
polarize the top leadership of the CCP. It is important to 
note that the officials who were the initial targets of the 
campaign had no power in the central government. Therefore, 
they could not constitute any real threat to the regime, and 
the charges that they planned to usurp the leadership would 
be utterly absurd unless viewed in the context of a power 
struggle between the top leaders.69
Mao continued his assault on the party by accusing it of 
attempting to emulate the ways of the Soviet Communist party,
68FitzGerald, 105-106, 115.
69Ellis Joffe, "China in Mid-1966: 'Cultural Revolution'
or Struggle for Power?," China Quarterly 27 (July-September
1966) : 128 .
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which he claimed was corrupting the communist revolution.70 
As stated above, the Soviet and the Chinese interpretations 
of communism were divergent. Mao was especially distrustful 
of the Soviets' attempt to dominate China politically as well 
as economically. Mao's suspicion of the Soviets led to the 
criticism of top Chinese officials. For example, Mao accused 
Liu of capitalist tendencies; he equated him with the Soviet 
leadership, calling him "China's Khrushchev."71 Mao 
criticized the Soviet government for ignoring the 
dictatorship of the Proletariat and claiming that the Soviet 
Union had reached the stage of communism where there was no 
class distinction. Mao contended that the Soviets had a 
definite class bifurcation comprised of a ruling elite and 
the proletariat. Since a class society remained, Mao 
asserted that the Soviet Union could not rightfully claim 
that it had moved past the first stage of communism. 
Therefore, those Mao believed to be sympathetic to the Soviet 
Union were labeled as traitors.
At this stage of the Cultural Revolution, in the spring 
of 1967, anyone having the slightest involvement with either 
the Soviet Union or the West was labeled a counter 
revolutionary and a traitor, and the rapidly growing range of 
the campaign grew beyond what could be considered rational.
70Bridgham, 3.
71Smith, 130.
42
Criticisms moved through the top leadership of the party and 
filtered down to the cadres who, at the grass-roots level, 
were charged with the implementation of the party policy and 
therefore had great influence over the masses. If Western or 
Soviet ideas were spread by tainted officials, the integrity 
of the continuous revolution would be in danger. Therefore, 
Mao reacted by invoking his doctrine of the mass line, and 
under its aegis, inciting the ordinary Chinese to seize power 
from below. He authorized the creation on an experimental 
basis of a new "Revolutionary Committee," an organ of power 
modelled after the Paris Commune. This Revolutionary 
Committee was to consist of a tripartite alliance of 
representatives of the revolutionary masses, representatives 
of the People's Liberation Army, and revolutionary party 
cadres.72 It was Mao’s intention to rely on the Revolutionary 
Committees to replace incumbent officials, especially the low 
level cadres, with people dedicated to the continuous 
revolution and Mao Zedong thought. Again, Mao was able to 
gain a political advantage by appealing to the masses to be 
his watchdogs. By means of the mass-line, he was able to 
purge the opposition of its grass-roots constituents.
The allegations of Western and Soviet ties of party 
members brought an end to several political careers. On the
72Ibid, 3-4. The revolutionary Party cadres were defined 
by Mao as those leading cadres who follow the proletarian 
revolutionary line.
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surface, purging the CCP of foreign influence seemed to be 
Mao's major goal of the campaign. There are, however, 
examples of individuals who seemed to be model party members, 
who supported Mao and the continuous revolution devoutly, but 
were purged nonetheless. For example, Peng Zhen, a Politburo 
member, appeared to be an exemplary party member but was 
labeled a counter-revolutionist, guilty of practically every 
anti-party crime imaginable.73 On the other hand Zhen Yun, 
another member of the party elite, openly disagreed with 
Mao's policies and could easily have been accused of being a 
counter-revolutionary, just as Peng and countless others had. 
He did not fall victim to criticism, nor was he purged. The 
inconsistency in treatment between Peng and Zhen, two 
political figures in similar positions, suggest that Mao had 
ulterior motives. The elimination of a loyal CCP member on 
one hand and the retention of an apparent party adversary on 
the other demonstrates that the party line was not the sole 
issue of the campaign.74 The apparently illogical pattern of 
the purges and criticisms undermined the stated goals of the 
campaign and suggests that Mao staged the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution for the main objective of removing anyone 
capable of consolidating enough power within the party to 
rival his authority. Mao had risen from his political
73Joffe, 126.
74Ibid, 127.
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retreat and illness during the post-Great Leap Forward 
period; he was determined to retain power as Chairman of the 
CCP. Therefore, everyone was suspected of being his enemy 
and no one was immune from the threat of being attacked or 
purged. Mao used the campaign as a political tool to remove 
any individual who had the potential of gaining enough 
support to break Mao's control of the party.
Another institution Mao believed to be laden with 
traitors was the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Mao had always 
been suspicious of intellectuals, especially scholars in 
philosophy and the social sciences. The Cultural Revolution 
presented him with an excellent opportunity to question the 
loyalty of a great many of his long time foes. Virtually all 
academic staff and many administrators of the Academy of 
Science were criticized in varying degrees. Those guilty of 
the most serious "crimes" were placed in special compounds or 
fields and made to do the lowest menial work. They were also 
subjected to constant ridicule and humiliation.^ Mao further 
used the campaign to test his theory of Red and Expert.
Trong R. Chai maintains that party members with more advanced 
degrees were less likely to be purged or attacked than those
75"Foreign Expert", "Eyewitness of the Cultural 
Revolution," China Quarterly 28 (October-December 1966) : 3.
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with only bachelor's degrees.76 This suggests that Mao used 
the lower level intellectuals as pawns to intimidate the 
higher officials of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
demonstrating to them that he possessed supreme executive 
power and that if they were unwilling to capitulate, they 
would be subjected to the same political attacks as their 
junior colleagues.
Another purpose of the criticism of the intellectuals 
was to make a show of strength by groups outside the party 
structure. To further his appeal to the masses, Mao wanted 
to turn the grievances of underprivileged groups against the 
"establishment" of party committees, educators, and 
especially high intellectuals. Tsou contends that the 
Cultural Revolution was a revolt of those outside the 
establishment against the establishment, or at least a large 
sector of it. He goes on to argue that the campaign was 
inspired, supported and manipulated by the supreme leader to 
perpetrate his crusade to attain revolutionary immortality.77
The Red Guard
The ostensible purpose of the mass line was to
76Trong R. Chai, "The Chinese Academy of Sciences in the 
Cultural Revolution: A Test of the 'Red and Expert' Concept," 
The Journal of Politics 43 (November, 1981): 1220.
77Tsou, 76.
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incorporate the people in the political process rather than 
simply having them put their faith in the leadership. Mao 
wanted to use the masses as his constituents and as a power- 
base outside the CCP. Once he had gained their trust and 
support, he could incorporate them into the party and thus 
reestablish his political authority. To accomplish his goal 
of gaining grass roots support, Mao turned to the young, to 
the Red Guard. The involvement of the Red Guard would prove 
to be extremely damaging to China as a whole. John King 
Fairbank characterizes it as being composed of inexperienced 
youth who were trying to learn revolution by making 
revolution, and causing great destruction in their wake.78
The Red Guard movement was initiated in 1966. Both Mao 
and Lin Biao encouraged college and high school students to 
band together to carry out the task of eliminating of the old 
capitalist ways.79 They were to attack and discredit 
opposition elements within the CCP.80 Students throughout 
China were enthusiastic to join for a variety of reasons. 
Inclusion in the movement gave members a sense of power and 
purpose and a heightened feeling of acceptance by their peers. 
For those who were more devoted to Mao's purpose, the crusade
78Fairbank, 324.
79Biographical information for Lin Biao in appendix A.
80Richard W. Wilson and Amy A. Wilson, "The Red Guards 
and the World Student Movement, " The China Quarterly 42 
(April-June 1971): 89.
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was seen to be a truly fulfilling experience. Others 
perceived the Red Guard as an opportunity to leave the 
countryside, to escape the tortuous lifestyle of a peasant. 
Some viewed the organization as a chance to vent pent up 
anger at society and the government because of career 
limitations, work assignments and a sensed discrimination 
concerning poor educational or family background. The 
opportunity for status and the thrill of leadership were also 
clearly essential components to the group's appeal.81 Why 
youths joined the Red Guard was at first of little 
consequence, but as the movement proceeded, the differences 
played an important role.
As stated earlier, the goal of the Red Guard was to 
attack the old ways and purge the party of any non-Chinese 
influences. Their organizational texts included statements 
such as, "We must remold the being of the people. We must 
defeat the handful of power-holders in the party who take the 
capitalist road. We must also criticize and discredit their 
reactionary line." The manuals also contained proclamations 
that Mao was the supreme leader of China and that Mao Zedong 
thought was the official ideology of the p a r t y .82
The modus operandi of the Red Guard was to carry out 
public attacks on those elements in society who were regarded
81Ibid, 90.
82Ibid, 91-92.
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as capitalists and counter-revolutionaries. These attacks 
consisted of parading the accused through the streets 
attired in dunce caps and placards that stated their crimes 
against society. The Red Guard also held mass rallies to 
vilify and condemn the authorities said to have taken the 
capitalist road and paraded with the infamous big character 
posters.83 These were hung in universities, government 
buildings and other public places, and were carried through 
the streets to broadcast the crimes of the counter 
revolutionaries. During the first week of the movement in 
May of 1966, the posters were torn down and the students were 
disciplined, but Mao later applauded the posters as a sign of 
the rejuvenation of the revolutionary spirit. The movement 
ultimately incorporated over 2 million students; such was 
their status that exams were postponed so as not to stifle 
their revolutionary fervor.84
The group most susceptible to the attacks of the Red 
Guard were the intellectuals. Because many university 
professors had ventured outside China in the course of their 
research, it was easy to accuse them of being corrupted by 
Western, bourgeois views. Several intellectuals were driven 
to suicide as a result of being shamed in front of their
83Ibid.
84Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After. (New York: The 
Free Press, 1986), 334.
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peers and subordinates.85
In addition to attacking Western ideas, the Red Guards’ 
second goal was to purge China of the "Four Olds." These 
were: old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits. 
The Four Olds were associated with the exploiting classes, 
those who were determined to corrupt the masses, capture 
their minds, and stage a comeback.86 The Four Olds were seen 
as elements of traditional, pre-revolutionary Chinese 
thought, which could arise anywhere. The Four Olds were 
deptected as a threat to the continuous revolution. Thus, 
the Red Guard went out among the people to seek out the Four 
Olds and eliminate them from society, removing the potential 
for a rejuvenation of the old bourgeois ways.87
The Four Olds concept granted the Red Guard free reign 
to destroy anything or anyone they defined as bourgeois. 
Attacks were aimed at hundreds of thousands of victims. In 
many cases, the people being attacked were simply older than 
the students, because the Red Guards were highly suspicious 
of anyone from a different generation; they contended that 
older people had been corrupted by the past and were not 
truly dedicated to continuous revolution. The Red Guard 
maintained that all people who held authority should be
85Ibid.
86Ibid, 336-337, and Townsend, 133.
87Ibid, 337.
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removed because they had grown complacent in their positions 
and were reverting to old ways.88 Some of their victims may 
have been singled out just because they were disliked for 
personal reasons.
At the outset of the Red Guard movement, Mao praised 
their efforts. With this official sanction, and facilitated 
by the closure of High schools and Universities in the fall 
of 1966 through the summer of 1968, Red Guard organizations 
mushroomed, bringing millions of young people into the 
streets to demonstrate support for Chairman Mao, to denounce 
and terrorize those said to be his opponents, and to destroy 
various symbols of bourgeois or reactionary culture.89
However, as the campaign progressed the cohesion of the 
group began to dissolve. Members differed on who was truly 
Maoist or revisionist, thus the Red Guard broke into 
competitive, and even hostile, factions, a development 
naturally encouraged by government officials who were under 
attack.90 This division of the Red Guard demonstrated to the 
party that Mao's campaign to recommit the country to the idea 
of the continuous revolution and to purge China of Western 
influences was not wholly sound. The mass line, which was
88Tsou, 82 .
89James R. Townsend and Brantly Womack, Politics in China 
3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986), 134.
90Ibid, 135.
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the basis of Mao's doctrine, provided no foundation for 
making distinctions among competing Maoist groups.
This degeneration of the campaign was enlightening to 
members of the CCP who had questioned Mao's crusade from the 
start. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution they 
were unable to take action to prevent Mao from carrying out 
his struggle; later they realized that if the Cultural 
Revolution were allowed to continue it would lead to utter 
chaos. These members of the CCP believed that, once the 
people understood that the Cultural Revolution was merely a 
show of power, an attempt by Mao to regain the leadership of 
China and to attain revolutionary immortality, they would 
reject the campaign as a political game and demand a more 
pragmatic and realistic government.91
Mao had relied upon a group of people who were not 
actually committed to his ideas. A large segment of the Red 
Guard saw the movement as a way to achieve personal goals and 
did not truly believe in the ideology of the campaign.92 They 
saw the Cultural Revolution as a way to vent aggression 
against those who held power over them. Mao gave them 
license to denounce those people as counter-revolutionaries. 
Furthermore, although they had carried out the Maoist 
injunction to awaken the masses, they often aroused workers
91Meisner, 340 .
92Ibid.
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and peasants to defend the existing order against the 
youthful, and often arrogant, Red Guards. The almost total 
lack of discipline, the violent factionalism, and the 
vandalism and hooliganism that characterized the movement led 
Maoist authorities in Beijing to conclude that the Red Guards 
had become a political liability. In 1967 stringent measures 
were taken to remove "the vanguard" of the Cultural 
Revolution from the center of the political stage.93 The 
excesses of the Red Guard left a lasting impression on the 
people of China.
The Rise of the Revolutionary Laffc
Even after Mao recognized that the Red Guard was a 
liability, he called for a broader based movement to 
incorporate the country as a whole, a movement to consolidate 
the political and economic aspects of the campaign.94 He 
wanted to execute the program in a major economic center to 
prove that it was viable as a policy. The next phase of the 
Cultural Revolution was, therefore, a movement in Shanghai 
which was labeled the "January Revolution."
To alleviate the problems that the Red Guard had caused, 
Mao called upon the mass line to take over not only the
93 Ibid.
94Townsend, 135.
53
counter revolutionaries, but to seize the means of 
production. Philip Bridgham contends that the expansion of 
the Cultural Revolution into the government and the economy 
caused increasing resistance which, in mid-December 1966, led 
to a final test of strength when Mao admonished his 
supporters to "seize power" in all party, government and 
economic organizations which continued to resist.95 With 
Mao's command to the workers to take control of China's labor 
organizations, the stage was set for the outbreak in Shanghai 
of what has come to be known as the January Revolution.96
On January 5, 1967 a dozen rebel organizations loosely 
allied with the worker's Headquarters published a "Message to 
All the People of Shanghai" in the city's leading newspaper 
Wen-Hui-pao, which had been taken over by insurgents two days 
before. The message deplored the divisions within the 
revolutionary movement, appealed to workers to return to the 
factories, and called for the unity of workers, students, 
intellectuals and cadres. On the following day more than a 
million citizens gathered to hold a mass meeting in the 
central city square. The mayor of Shanghai and other high 
city party officials were denounced, removed from their
95Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: 
The Struggle to Seize Power," China Quarterly 30 (April-June, 
1968): 8.
96At this stage of the Cultural Revolution, groups 
advocating the mass line were also refereed to as the 
Revolutionary Left. Ibid.
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positions, and forced to make public confessions of their 
political sins. Over the next few days, other officials and 
cadres were paraded through the streets with dunce caps and 
placards .97
Rule over Shanghai came too quickly for the 
Revolutionary Left; they were too inexperienced to carry out 
the duties of the government. Shanghai turned into a 
chaotic, unmanageable city, overrun by Mao's supporters who 
lacked adequate organizational skills to maintain any 
semblance of order. Shanghai was not the only major 
municipality to experience this overthrow from the workers. 
Nearly all major cities and provinces were affected by the 
January Revolution and the "seize power" movement, and local 
governments accross China soon ground to a halt.98
Xhs Bals q£ the -g.aaglera Liberation Army
Turmoil increasingly characterized China's politics in 
the spring of 1967; wide-spread strikes crippled the economy. 
Perhaps Mao saw no alternative to the People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) to regain control of the cities. Perhaps he 
forsaw that the PLA would become involved one way or the 
other, and called on the PLA in order to ensure that he would
97Meisner, 346-347.
98Ibid, 9.
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retain control of the situation, since the Army would seem to 
be the natural ally of Liu Shaoqi and the pragmatists, 
perhaps Mao's decision to call in the Army was aimed at 
cutting off the pragmatists from this action. Whatever the
reason, Mao and Lin directed the PLA to assist the
Revolutionary Left in their struggle to gain control of the
economy and local governments of the major metropolitan areas.
They did not intend the army to fight against the people, 
buts ecame more turbulent, the military became more prominent 
in administering the government and the economy." The PLA 
entered factories and communes to institute discipline in 
order to recover production of goods and services. Where 
revolutionary committees were established, it was usually the 
military that assumed the dominant position in the tripartite 
alliance, more often than not siding with the old cadres 
rather than the representatives of mass organizations.100
The fact that the PLA was willing to solicit the 
assistance of the deposed cadres was symbolic of the ebbing 
tide of the Cultural Revolution. The leaders of the army 
realized from the outset that the unorganized mass line was 
incapable of maintaining a workable government.101 Therefore, 
the PLA interpreted its role in the campaign as an order-
"Meisner, 351. 
10°Ibid.
101Bridgham, 12.
56
restoring organization that would suppress the strikes, 
overcome the pronounced tendency towards anarchy which had 
characterized the behavior of the Revolutionary Left during 
the January Revolution, and re-establish a functional 
government and e c o n o m y . 102 in addition to restoring order in 
the government and in the economy, military leaders decided 
to rehabilitate deposed CCP cadres to make use of their 
administrative skills. The PLA therefore emphasized humane 
treatment of party officials.103
The decision in favor of military intervention was both 
momentous and incongruous, for now the PLA, the most 
bureaucratic agency of the state apparatus, was called upon 
to promote what was supposed to be a popular revolutionary 
movement against bureaucratic elitism.104 The Cultural 
Revolution was in an extreme political crisis. Mao was 
forced to turn to those whom he had originally denounced as 
counter-revolutionaries to save China from complete disarray.
With standards changing so quickly, months passed during 
which virtually no social forms could be described as stable. 
Criticisms of those in authority extended to virtually all 
government leaders; violent clashes took place between 
contending groups within the Red Guards and Revolutionary
102Ibid.
103Ibid, 11.
104Meisner, 350.
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Rebels; there was massive shifting of sides amidst a sea of 
ideological fervor and opportunism; and there was 
considerable breakdown in work schedules, transportation, and 
communications throughout various parts of the country. It 
became difficult indeed for anyone to be certain which group 
was furthering revolutionary immortality.105
The Thermidor of the Cultural Revolution1° 6
Mao's genius for survival led him to reverse his field 
when he saw the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution out of 
control. He called upon the PLA to regain control of China's 
shattered government and economy. To retain legitimacy, he 
hailed the PLA as a people's army, formed and led by himself, 
and commanded by Vice Supreme Commander Lin Biao.107 He 
wanted the masses to surrender control of the bureaucracy to 
the army.
By late summer of 1967, the campaign had degenerated so
105Lifton, 140.
106Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, rev. ed.
(New York: Vintage, 1965), 205-236. Brinton defines 
Thermidor as "a convalescence from the fever of revolution." 
It is a retreat from the goals of the revolution. Once the 
revolution has been won the focus is shifted from fighting 
the battles to implenting the policies and administrating the 
daily function of government. It is also a chance for the 
people to return to a regular pattern and lead more stable 
lives.
107Meisner, 357.
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completely that the Cultural Revolution Group, the members 
Mao appointed to carry out the campaign, collapsed. This 
group included Wang Li, Guan Feng, Qi Benyu, Chen Boda and 
Lin Biao.108 They were arrested on Mao’s order, due to the 
ultra-leftist approach of the campaign. In May of 1967, Mao 
had altered the direction of the movement to a more moderate 
course; and, those who did not follow the new policy were 
branded ultra-leftists and eliminated from the Cultural 
Revolutionary Group.109 He had succeeded in eliminating any 
possible political rivals and had regained the political 
prominence that he had sought in the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution.110
Things were changing at such a rapid pace that it was 
difficult for the people to comprehend exactly what was 
taking place, and they were confused as to the proper 
interpretation of Maoist thought. They questioned how one 
should distinguish between genuine and counterfeit Red 
Guards. Further, they asked if the Shanghai Commune was to 
be an ideal model for all of China, what was one to think of 
the Triple Alliance which replaced it just a few days after 
it came into being. For most Chinese, the path to
108Biograhpical information for Wang Li, Guan Feng, Qi 
Benyu and Chen Boda in appendix A.
109Ibid, 358.
110Bridgham, 23.
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revolutionary immortality had become obscured and enduring 
emotional commitment was close to impossible.111
With the campaign moving in a more pragmatic path, Mao 
continued his purge of the ultra-left. The struggle had made 
the people weary and the goals of the Revolution became 
blurred in the haze of a political struggle that they no 
longer supported.112 People who had once led the battle 
against Western corruption turned politically passive, and 
many of their organizations disintegrated or became dormant. 
Consequently, in the fall of 1968, the tumultuous period of 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution came to a close, 
leaving Mao, supported by the PLA, to rebuild China's 
government.
With the political situation stabilized and the 
radicalism of the mass movement stifled, the CCP central 
committee convened its twelfth plenum in October of 1969.
The main business was to recognize that Mao had once again 
unrivaled leadership of the party. This was done by the 
formal expulsion of Liu Shaoqi from the party, a decision 
publicly announced at the end of the month. It was further 
announced that Liu had been removed from all his official 
appointments, including that of chairman of the People's 
Republic, a government position he formally owed not to the
1:L1Lifton, 140.
112Meisner, 361.
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CCP but to the National People's Congress. The charge was 
that Liu had followed a "capitalist road" and was a 
"renegade, traitor, and scab" and a secret agent of the 
Guomindang who had consistently betrayed the party since 
1922. Now it could be suggested that the Liuist deviation was 
an alien intrusion. The struggle between the "two lines" 
could be reduced to a struggle between revolutionaries and 
counter-revolutionaries, between a proletarian party that, on 
the whole, had maintained its revolutionary purity and enemy 
agents who had infiltrated its ranks from the outside.113 His 
main adversary had finally been removed from the political 
scene and Mao was now the unquestioned leader of the Chinese 
Communist Party, his victory over the pragmatists was 
complete.
113Ibid, 363.
Chapter III g-j
Analysis of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
This chapter will describe the final stages of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution by exploring three aspects of 
Mao's decline: first, Mao's fall from prominence; second,
the struggle for power among factions; third, the triumph of 
the moderates. Then it will argue that the campaign was a 
short-term political victory for Mao, who regained his party 
prominence, but a long-term failure, by a man who refused to 
modernize, a failure which had devastating and lasting 
effects on China. Finally, it will be argued that Mao's 
obsession with revolutionary immortality was the major 
impetus for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Map’s EalI From Prominence
The cult of personality that emerged around Mao, the 
legendary Chairman and revolutionary commander, grew, in 
essence, into a religion from the start of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966, until his death. In 
the beginning, the cult flourished on the basis of the 
genuine revolutionary fervor of the masses.114 Mao claimed 
victory in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, though 
it is clear now that little was actually accomplished by the 
chaotic and costly campaign. Mao's personal authority
114Meisner, 363.
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it is clear now that little was actually accomplished by the 
chaotic and costly campaign. Mao's personal authority 
continued, as during the campaign, to serve as the 
legitimator of policy; party leaders stressed Maoist concepts 
such as self-reliance, the mass line and the continuing 
revolution. Official statements asserted that the Great 
Cultural Revolution was still in progress, and that Chinese 
society was still engaged in a fierce struggle between the 
Maoist and revisionist lines. This radical rhetoric 
discouraged realistic national policies and plans to move 
China forward. It encouraged, instead, an experimental 
approach that permitted much local diversity and aimed more 
at reform of thought and behavior than at attainment of 
quantifiable targets.115
The Ninth Party Congress, which convened in April of 
1969, officially declared that Mao was the indisputable 
leader of the CCP. This was clearly a sign that Mao had in 
fact not accomplished his goals but it was an attempt by the 
party to put an end to the campaign. In addition, party 
leaders maintained that they would execute reform measures in 
accordance with Mao's objectives, but the implementation of 
Mao's resolutions did not come to fruition for a number of 
reasons. First, the majority of top officials had been 
purged, and the replacements were not united in their
115Townsend, 137 .
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interpretation of the Cultural Revolution's legacy; they soon 
succumbed to renewed factional conflict. Second, the 
institutional uncertainty and disarray produced by the 
campaign complicated efforts to advance new policies.116 
Finally, the CCP leadership faced a succession crisis: their 
aging leader was near death, and there was no clear choice of 
a successor.
Deng Xiaoping was selected by the party leaders to take 
the political reins after Mao's death but the Gang of Four, 
the last of the Maoist supporters, thwarted Deng's rise to 
top party leadership. This appointment by the party was 
another sign that Mao had lost his imfluence over the CCP. 
Consequently, it became obvious that the appraisal and 
reappraisal of Mao might continue for generations. As the 
post mortem analysis of his policies took place, his image 
began to deteriorate rapidly. For example, if Mao's true 
goal had been to liberate the rural masses, how could he have 
stood by while starvation and death befell so many of them? 
Was he more interested in power than in economic progress?
The evidence suggests that Mao's objective was more political 
than economic, and that the CCP revolution was a drive for 
power by a group dedicated to unifying and controlling China. 
On their way up, their publicized aim was liberation and a 
new democracy. Once in power, however, their objective began
116Ibid
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to shift toward retaining power. Eventually this led to a 
factional power struggle and Mao's class-struggle ideology 
became an abstraction, an instrument in the conflict, not 
connected with a realistic goal.117
The Power Struggle..,Among ..Factions; the Gang of Four
Scarcely had the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party closed in April 1969, proclaiming the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution a glorious triumph and having declared 
itself a congress of "unity and victory," when new political 
struggles erupted to shatter such "unity" as had been 
achieved. The struggles revolved around the issues raised 
during the Cultural Revolution (and left unresolved) and were 
inflamed by the political passions that the great upheaval 
continued to arouse. But unlike the days of the Cultural 
Revolution itself, when the masses were involved in battles 
against bureaucratic authority, Chinese politics now reverted 
to factional strife among Communist leaders of the 
bureaucracy, entirely hidden from public view.118 This 
section and the next two sections will explore the three main 
rival factions and their struggles for power, including the 
Gang of Four, Lin Biao and the military, and finally, the
117Fairbank, 340-341.
118Meisner, 397.
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moderates.
By 1972, Mao was grew increasingly feeble. He was no 
longer able to make public appearances; he withdrew to the 
Forbidden City, away from public life. Mao's supporters were 
still in top party positions, however, and their political 
survival was dependent on the patronage and support of the 
ailing Mao. The most prominent of his followers were Zhang 
Chunqiao, the self-appointed leader of the abortive Shanghai 
Commune; Yao Wenyuan, a radical who wrote a celebrated 
article announcing the opening of the Cultural Revolution; 
Wang Hongwen, the former Shanghai textile worker whom the 
Tenth Congress of 1973 had placed near the top of the party 
hierarchy; and Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, who was instrumental 
in the opening of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution.119 Later known as the Gang of Four, they were all 
members of the politburo and two (Zhang and Wang) were in the 
standing committee. For the most part, their control was 
confined to the cultural realm and to the official media, 
which in any system are extremely influential because they 
are a direct link to the masses. By means of the media, the 
Gang of Four was able to communicate its political 
perspective to the majority of the Chinese people. The Gang 
of Four also had in its arsenal a devoted secret police 
force, comprised of loyal supporters and separate from the
119Biograhpical information for Zhang Chunqiao,
YaoWenyuan and Wang Hongwen in appendix A. Meisner, 419.
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ordinary police, which was dispatched to terrorize those who 
were labeled counterrevolutionary rightists.120 The two main 
objectives of the Gang were to represent the interests of the 
new cadres who had been brought in during the Cultural 
Revolution to support Maoist principles and to oust Deng 
Xiaoping from his position as Vice Premier. The Gang seized 
the opportunity of Zhou Enlai's funeral to express its 
disdain for the Vice Premier. Deng was given the honor of 
delivering Zhou's eulogy, but this was one of his last public 
appearances as the Vice Premier. Wall posters denounced him 
as China's Khrushchev and a leader of a capitalist movement. 
Jiang Qing charged him with being an international capitalist 
agent.
The campaign against Deng continued with the Gang 
accusing him of being responsible for riots on the national 
day of mourning at Tienanmen Square in the center of Beijing, 
which had been the site of massive rallies by the Red Guard 
only a decade before. This incident came about when several 
thousand mourners came to pay their respects to the fallen 
leader Zhou. The Maoists attempted to disperse the immense 
crowd and this action incensed the multitude of mourners, who 
subsequently began to riot. The violence was kept to a 
minimum because some of the troops sent in to maintain order 
were sympathetic to the crowd. The protest would later
120Meisner., 422.
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become a symbol of articulation of discontent in a seemingly 
despotic state. The Maoists, however, harbored a quite 
different view of the occurrence. The Party Politburo 
labeled the riot as a demonstration by counter 
revolutionaries. Deng bore the brunt of the blame and was 
removed from power. There was an appeal to the masses to 
take part in a campaign to denounce Liu, but to the dismay of 
the Gang of Four, few showed their support for the criticism. 
There was a wave of secret police repression, and tens of 
thousands were arrested as alleged counter-revolutionaries.121
On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong died and the moderates 
wasted little time severing their ties with the radical 
Maoists. In early October, with the period of mourning for 
the late Chairman barely concluded, the politburo purged the 
Gang of Four, the last remaiming Maoists in top party 
positions. They were seized and accused of having conspired 
to commandeer state power, among a vast melange of other 
charges. Hua Guofeng, a moderate, assumed Mao's post as 
Chairman of the CCP.122
The era of Mao had drawn to a close. He left China with 
severe economic and political problems. Dedicating itself to
121The notes for the Gang of Four were taken from Meisner, 
418-428, and Jurgen Domes, "The 'Gang of Four' and Hua 
Guofeng: Analysis of Political Events in 1975-76," China 
Quarterly 71 (September-December, 1977): 473-497.
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a more pragmatic style of policy, the CCP leadership 
including Hua Guofeng was determined to restore the economic 
program of the post-Great Leap Forward period, and one of its 
first courses of action was to initiate a rectification 
campaign to reinstate officials purged during the tumultuous 
period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Lin Biao's Last Stand
In 1969, Lin Biao had reached the number two spot in 
the party next to Mao and was designated successor to the top 
leadership position. Lin brought the military into 
increasing prominence in both party and government. While 
the military was divided between the Central Military Command 
at Beijing and the regional commands in the provinces,
General Lin Biao, PLA Chief of Staff, was Mao's designated 
successor.123
Shortly, differences arose between him and Mao. For 
example, Mao wanted to bring about the rapid restoration of 
the party, which was for him the first and most essential 
order of domestic business.124 In the later stages of the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the PLA had become the 
dominant force in the political life of the nation and Mao
123Fairbank, 334 .
124Meisner, 400.
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wanted to de-emphasize its role in favor of a more 
bureaucratized system of government. Lin Biao was opposed to 
the restoration of old cadres. The more the party was 
strengthened through the return of pre-Cultural Revolution 
officials, the less power Lin Biao had. Consequently, in the 
fall of 1969, at the Ninth Congress, Lin proposed that the 
policies implemented in the early stages of the Cultural 
Revolution should continue to be in use. Lin did not have 
any strong base of support in the Party Congress; his 
proposal was unsuccessful, and resulted in a rift between Lin 
and Mao. Mao began to suspect Lin of personal ambitions. 
According to Mao, Lin and his cohort Chen Boda carried out a 
surprise attack at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress of 
the Central Committee known as the Lushan meeting. This 
attack consisted of speeches critical of the foreign and 
domestic policies of Zhou Enlai, surprising only because 
their content was not discussed with Mao b e f o r e h a n d . 125
As a result of Lin's power move, moderates criticized 
him for obstructing the process of party rebuilding.
Moreover, the Party Congress endorsed new foreign policies 
designed by Zhou Enlai which were based on peaceful 
coexistence between countries with different social systems. 
Still, Lin Biao was a formidable polical force. He was not 
only Mao's official heir apparent and China's Minister of
izsibid, 402.
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Defense, had emerged from the Cultural Revolution with a 
popular prestige seemingly second only to that of the 
Chairman himself. Dating back to the Long March, Lin had 
been one of the great heroes and leaders of the Chinese 
Revolution and one of Mao's closest comrades. Further, the 
extent of military support Lin commanded was unknown in 
autumn of 1970.
Lin Biao strongly supported the Cultural Revolution but 
it was widely apparent that the CCP had taken a major turn 
away from these ideologically based policies in favor of more 
pragmatic methods of running the country. Following the 
Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee at Lushan, Mao 
set up party committees in all the provinces, effectively 
subordinating the provincial revolutionary committees, which 
had been endorsed by the General.126 Lin, it was clear, no 
longer subscribed to Mao’s views; his subsequent removal from 
power was inevitable. This, however, would not come cleanly 
or simply. A power struggle ensued between Mao and Lin which 
ended rather mysteriously.
According to Maurice Meisner, Lin Biao plotted a coup 
d'etat that involved an attempt to assassinate Mao Zedong. A 
document known as "Outline of the '571 Project'", supposedly 
the plan to murder the Chairman, stated that the plotters 
"planned to attack Chairman Mao’s special train with
126Ibid, 404 .
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flamethrowers and bazookas, dynamite the Shuofang railway 
bridge near Suzhou over which the train was scheduled to 
pass, bomb the train from the air or blow up the oil depot 
near the stop of the train in Shanghai."127 If this plan 
failed, the Chairman was to be shot by a member of his own 
bodyguard when he reached Shanghai. The plan never came to 
fruition. Zhou Enlai acknowledged in a meeting with a group 
of American newspaper editors in Late 1972 that the "571 
Project" was never put into operation. There was, in fact, 
no attempt on Mao's life and no effort to carry out the 
alleged coup; instead, fearing the plot had been discovered, 
Lin hastily fled on the ill-fated plane that crashed in 
Mongolia. Whatever Lin Biao's motives, his demise, and the 
purge of his supporters in the party, PLA, and revolutionary 
committees, removed the last barriers to the consolidation of 
the post-Cultural Revolution order which Mao and Zhou 
designed.128
The Triumph of the Moderates
Elite conflict in the 1970s combined elements of both 
the initial and latter stages of the Cultural Revolution. 
Generally, leaders tried to contain conflict, to avoid open
127Ibid, 406.
128Ibid, 406.
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charges and mass mobilization in their struggles and to keep 
purges secret until after the event; the two key purges, of 
Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, brought mass criticism 
campaigns only after the victors had acted against their 
targets.
By 1972, Zhou was the active party leader, as Mao 
increasingly withdrew from public life.129 Zhou supported a 
policy of reinstating in their original positions cadres who 
had been purged in the course of the Cultural Revolution. 
These reinstated cadres effectively replaced those who had 
taken their posts during the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution by 1973. Mao supported this policy, attempting to 
balance the radical and moderate factions of the party.130 He 
maintained that China could utilize their skills as 
experienced bureaucrats. The decline of Mao's ideologically 
based policies made possible more moderate and pragmatic 
approaches. China desperately needed a leader who could 
formulate programs designed to deal with her real and 
pressing political and economic problems.
Zhou's tenure as Premier lasted from 1972 until his 
death in January 1976. Deng Xiaoping, now Chief of Staff of 
the PLA, who had essentially taken over Zhou's duties during 
the premier's illness, was unable to consolidate power and
129Townsend, 323.
i30Meisner, 409.
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Mao denied him the premiership. Still holding some political
reins, Mao was unwilling to let either the moderates or the
radicals have complete control. Consequently, Hua Guofeng 
became premier as a compromise between the competing
factions. His position was not solid, however, despite his
claims that he was Mao's personal choice. Hua's main 
objective was to consolidate the factions and once again to 
have a united party.
After the purge of the Gang of Four, the CCP rested on a 
broad coalition. The CCP leadership enjoyed prominent support 
from the military, in spite of the Lin Biao disaster; the 
majority of the factionalized PLA sided with the moderates. 
The moderates, called for the restoration of Deng. Hua 
initially resisted restoring Deng to his previous party and 
government positions but was eventually persuaded and he and 
Deng maintained a working relationship in advancing 
modernization policies. There were evident differences 
between Hua and Deng, however, with Hua emphasizing 
intellectual and educational reforms and Deng more emphatic 
about the need for economic, scientific, and technical 
advances.131
Deng and his supporters became more aggressive in 1978, 
pushing for further diminution of Mao's stature and demotion 
of several Politburo members associated with Deng's 197 6
131Ibid., 326.
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setback. For example, Wu De, the mayor of Beijing, who had 
led the suppression of the Tiananmen demonstration and 
subsequent criticism of Deng, was removed from office.
Others to fall victim to Deng's wrath were Chen Xilian, 
commander of the Beijing military region, Ji Dengkui, party 
ideologist of the Beijing region and Wang Dongxing, member of 
the Politburo Standing Committee and the head of the security 
establishment.132 Since removal of these men would strip Hua 
of much of his Politburo support, the campaign suggested that 
Deng might be seeking Hua's post. Deng's supporters openly 
criticized the crack down on the April Fifth Movement and 
denounced the Cultural Revolution, but stopped short of 
condemning Mao's entire post-1965 career. These themes were 
also very threatening to Hua, whose position rested very 
heavily on Mao's endorsement and the Tiananmen affair.133
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, held 
in December 1978, confirmed Deng's political ascendancy to 
Chief of Staff of the PLA and began a major new phase of 
Chinese politics. In addition to endorsing many demands 
associated with him, reversal of the Tiananmen verdict, 
continued rehabilitation of veteran cadres, the stronger 
criticism of the Cultural Revolution, the Plenum added 
several of Deng's supporters to the Politburo and to other
132Biographical information for Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui
and Wang Dongxing in appendix A.
133Ibid., 327.
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high state and party posts. There was compromise, too, as 
Hua initially retained his leading positions and considerable 
Politburo support; however, the victory of Deng, rather than 
the compromise with Hua, turned out to be the lasting result 
of the Third Plenum. Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi were 
posthumously rehabilitated. Criticism of Mao and the 
Cultural Revolution increased in volume and in severity.
This had a direct impact upon Hua Guofeng because he was the 
last remaining leader from the Mao Zedong era. The criticism 
marked the final stage of Hua's decline in power. He ceded 
the premiership to Zhao Ziyang in 1980.134 In 1982, the post 
of party chairman was abolished and Hua lost his Politburo 
seat (although as of 1985, he still retained a seat on the 
Central Committee).135
The Maoist era had in reality come to an end with the 
fall of Hua. The moderates had a firm grip on the political 
reigns and the party was consolidated for the first time 
since the post-Great Leap Forward period.
134Biograhpical information for Zhao Ziyang in appendix
A.
135Ibid., 328.
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Chapter IV 
Conclusion
This chapter will summarize the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution. It will illustrate the scope of the 
thesis by analyzing the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, seen through several elements of Mao Zedong's 
thought. It will also appraise the power struggle between 
Mao and the moderates led by Liu Shaoqi. In addition, it 
will evaluate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as a 
case study of relying too greatly on a policy that is 
idealistic and ignores reality.
Finally, this thesis will assert that the underlying 
basis for the campaign was Mao's desire for revolutionary 
immortality. The thesis will conclude that Mao's obsession 
with securing his place in history led him to elliminate any 
possible threats to his power, at great cost to China.
Analysis Of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
From the beginning of Mao's involvement with the Chinese 
Communist Party, he was loyal to the peasantry. He was 
devoted to those who had helped the CCP wrest power from the 
KMT. Mao developed his ideology with the peasants foremost 
in his thoughts. The mass line theory argued that reliance
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upon the people as a whole was the most efficient method to 
bring about rapid industrialization. The continuous 
revolution was designed to maintain the enthusiasm sparked by 
the struggle for freedom from the previous, repressive 
government and to channel this energy to bring about total 
socialism. Similarly, the idea of the Reds versus Experts, a 
struggle between the Maoists and the moderates, was to give 
more control of production to the people and less to the 
technological elite, who were Mao's enemies.
This section of the thesis will analyze the importance 
of Mao Zedong thought in the implementation of the Great 
Cultural Revolution. The main ideas that Mao wanted to 
inculcate in the lives of the people of China were the 
continuous revolution, mass line participation, and reliance 
upon the official party ideology, coupled with technical 
competence to bring about rapid industrialization, summarized 
under the slogan red and expert. Each of these three 
examples of Mao Zedong thought will be explored and appraised 
individually.
The Continuous Revolution. Mao's belief that the people were 
losing their revolutionary fervor may have been correct, but 
the revolution had already been won. They had committed 
themselves to the new government and were making slow 
progress in the transition to communism. Mao wanted to 
expedite the reform of China's political system became 
traditional Confucianism as well as Western capitalist
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influences still remained after the revolution. Mao 
contended that their presence was hazardous to the system; 
that people could become corrupted by them. Under the slogan 
of the continuous revolution, he turned to the young to 
revive revolutionary enthusiasm and used the Red Guard to 
mobilize and politicize them. Dependence upon a group of 
high school and college students to carry out the campaign 
proved to be one of the most catastrophic mistakes of the 
Cultural Revolution. They became intoxicated with power and 
employed the movement to sure their selfish ambitions.
Wanton destruction by the Red Guard resulted in two 
problems for Mao and his supporters. First, the Red Guard 
purged, imprisoned, or murdered thousands of cadres and 
intellectuals, as well as many others who had nothing to do 
with the government. This indiscriminate persecution created 
a void in the bureaucracy and much of government came to a 
halt. Untrained and ineffective replacements were unable to 
carry out the duties of the state. China's economy and 
political system could not function and the country collapsed 
in chaos.
Second, the intemperance of the Red Guard compelled Mao 
to initiate a tripartite alliance between the new Leftists, 
the PLA, and the rectified cadres to regain order. This 
coalition was evidence that the idea of a continuous 
revolution was a failure.
The Mass Line. Mao's idea in the mass line campaign was to
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involve as many people as possible in the party in order to 
lend a great measure of legitimacy to the CCP. The people 
would be more willing to support the system if they were 
incorporated into it. Mao's mass line campaign was a 
complete failure. He failed to realize from the debacle of 
the Great Leap Forward that mass participation in a country 
as large as China was simply not an efficient method of 
industrialization. Poor planning and leadership resulted in 
a great leap backwards instead of a progressive 
industrialization of China. What Mao should have learned 
from the Great Leap Forward is that reliance upon an 
idealistic philosophy, such as the concept of mass line 
participation, cannot serve as a substitute for the use of 
trained technocrats. He believed too strongly that faith in 
the peasantry was a suitable replacement for experience and 
education; he felt that people could solve any problem, 
whether economic, political, or social, merely by strength in 
numbers. The Great Leap Forward was a clear example of the 
flaws of the mass line theory.
However, Mao clung tenaciously to the masses by relying 
upon them again in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 
In this case, he relied upon the Red Guard. This group of 
youths was eager to join in the struggle because as a mass 
movement, it was able to gain a great deal of autonomy. Over 
two million students were involved in the Red Guard, but as 
the Great Leap Forward proved, numbers alone were not enough
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to bring about advances in industrialization or 
politicization. The members of the Red Guard were taken out 
of their environment and thrust into a situation that was 
destined to bring chaos, destruction, and turmoil as they 
tried to purge bureaucrats, intellectuals, pragmatists, 
capitalists and industrial managers.
Once these groups were eliminated, the Maoists were left 
to run the system, but the peasants and students did not 
possess the ability to administor the country effectively. 
Most Chinese people were trained for only one task, such as 
farming or working in factories. They had no management or 
technical skills to maintain production and the factories 
were unable to function without properly educated 
administrators.
The mass line was a failure. Mao was unable to learn 
from his previous mistakes. Without skilled managers to run 
the industries, or bureaucrats to carry out policy, or 
intellectuals to criticize the government to point out 
weaknesses to be corrected, the system ceased to function.
Red and Expert. Mao believed that the intellectuals and 
technocrats, the so called "Experts", were corrupt and were 
plotting to overthrow the system. This conviction compelled 
him to replace them with the Reds, the peasants who, in Mao's 
eyes, were truly dedicated to China. In order for the 
system to be preserved, Mao felt that the people should have 
a strict devotion to the party and one of the main goals of
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the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, therefore, was to 
indoctrinate the people, specifically the young, to the 
practice of Chinese Communism as perceived by its leader.
This infusion of Mao Zedong thought was believed to be a 
sufficient substitute for the use of trained technicians in 
the bureaucracy and industries.
As the campaign continued, it became increasingly clear 
that Mao had in fact made a serious error with the 
implementation of the Red idea. Chaos, inefficiency, and the 
near complete collapse of both bureaucratic and industrial 
production resulted from the implementation of the concept. 
Ordinary workers did not have the proper training to run the 
government or the factories. Instead of bringing about a 
more productive commerce and a more proficient bureaucracy, 
the Reds stifled the system, which regressed due to their 
inability to fulfill technical and managerial duties. Mao 
was simply unwilling to believe that people trained 
specifically for the tasks of managing factories and running 
the bureaucracy were needed to maintain efficient production. 
Workers with very limited technical knowledge were helpless 
without the aid of the engineers and bureaucrats. Mao's 
preoccupation with being Red as distinct from Expert 
reflected a crucial confrontation between revolutionary 
purity and modern technology. The glorification of Redness 
and the undermining of Expertness threatened to eliminate the
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intellectuals as a functioning group.136 This profound 
mistake contributed to bringing China's government and 
industry to a standstill.
The Struggle for Power
After falling from power, due to the failure of the 
Great Leap Forward, Mao temporarily retired from politics to 
devise a strategy to regain his lost prominence. The main 
objective was to oust the leaders who stood in his way. To 
accomplish this, Mao attempted to divide the party into those 
who supported him, and those who followed Liu Shaoqi, and 
other moderates. Mao was able to mobilize enough support to 
gain control of the Party Congress by accusing the moderates 
of being Western capitalists. He indicted loyal leaders on 
such a mass scale that it was impossible to substantiate his 
charges.
No one was above suspicion. Mao contended that the 
whole governmental bureaucracy as well as intellectuals had 
been corrupted by Western elements. This wide-scale 
accusation was, in reality, the method by which Mao sought to 
regain his lost power. His success came at great expense. 
Victory was claimed by Mao, and by those who had avoided 
falling victim to his wrath, in 1969, but the spoils of the
136Lifton, 53 .
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triumph were hollow. When the campaign ended, Mao could 
claim leadership in name only. Mao held only de jure 
leadership while the moderates possessed de facto control of 
the CCP.
Revolutionary Immortality
Throughout this thesis, Robert Lifton's term 
"revolutionary immortality" has been suggested as one of the 
factors which led Mao to such drastic actions. Lifton argues 
that Mao was confronted with his own mortality and 
desperately sought measures to insure his place in history. 
Lifton furthers asserts that for a man in Mao's position, of 
his age and special commitments, the affirmation of a sense 
of immortality is crucial. The overwhelming threat is not so 
much death itself as the suggestion that his "works" will not 
endure.137 Mao's ultimate fear, the image of extinction that 
haunted him, was the death of the revolution. When he 
criticized the Red Guard's inability to fulfill its goals, 
his overriding concern was that the revolutionary legacy 
would be squandered. Mao seems to have believed that if the 
revolutionary perished, the revolution would perish as well.
Mao's quest to live forever in the hearts and minds of 
his countrymen can serve as an explanation for his apparently
137Ibid, 14.
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irrational decision to launch the the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution. As presented in this thesis, there is 
much evidence that the Cultural Revolution represents the 
culmination of a series of conflicts surrounding his 
campaigns, and of Mao's increasing inability to fulfill the 
visions or achieve the transformations of the physical and 
spiritual environment claimed by the campaigns.138 In fact, 
one could view the entire Cultural Revolution as Mao's demand 
for renewal of communist life. In other words, it was a call 
for reassertion of revolutionary immortality.
Mao’s ultimate purposemay have been to transform China 
into communism or an industrial power, but his more immediate 
motives appear to have been much more selfish. He wanted to 
secure his place in history as the greatest leader of China. 
He wanted nothing to stand in his way and he eliminated 
ruthlessly those he saw as threats to his power. As a result 
of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, China was set 
back economically, politically, industrially and 
educationally. Ironically, Mao may have been successful in 
attaining immortality, but he may be remembered more for his 
opportunistic political exploits than for leading China to 
communism and modernity.
138Ibid, 21.
Appendix A
Biography of Maior Political Figures
1. Chen Boda was one of the co-leaders of the Cultural 
Group. It was composed mainly of radical intellectuals and 
its purpose, as a quasi-official agency, was to guide the 
Cultural Revolution. The Group assumed many of the powers of 
the Party Central Committee and Politburo. Chen was elevated 
to one of five members of the party’s Standing Committee of 
the Politburo as well as being Mao's personal secretary. His 
political demise came when he was directly linked to Lin Biao 
in a coup attempt with Lin Biao. Chen was purged from the 
party and labeled as "China's Trotsky."
2. Chen Xilian was the Commander of the Beijing military 
region. In autumn 197 8 he was targeted by anti-leftists as 
one of the few zealous supporters of Maoist thought. His 
removal marked a further reduction in Hua Guofeng's power.
3. Chen Yun was appointed a member of the Standing 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo in 1949. 
He was one of China's main economic planners and was 
principally responsible for the First Five Year Plan of 1953- 
57. He criticized the Great Leap Forward and was purged form 
the party. After the Maoist era, Chen was reinstated to 
advise in the rebuilding of China's economy by Hua Guofeng in
1977.
4. Deng Xiaoping, a party activist since the early 1920's, 
was the last of the May Fourth generation of Chinese
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Communist leaders. He made significant contributions to the 
revolutionary effort which he earned a prominent place in the 
party. Deng sided with Liu Shaoqi in the post-Great Leap 
period. As a result, he was purged while acting as Party 
General Secretary. In 1973 he was reinstated to his party 
post.
5. Guan Feng was a member of the Cultural Revolution Group 
and was one of the leading writers and propagandists of the 
early stages of the campaign. He was also a member of the 
May 16 Group which was comprised of highly devoted Maoists.
He was eventually identified as an "ultra-left conspirator" 
and purged in the late summer of 1969.
6. Hua Guofeng was extremely loyal to Mao and a lifelong 
bureaucrat. He rose through the party ranks to Minister of 
Public Security and eventually to Premier of the State 
Council. Relatively unknown in the party mainstream, he was 
seen by Mao as a moderate. Hua had no true ties to either 
the hard-line Maoists or the pragmatists. Mao hoped that he 
would be a stabilizing force in the party, thus Hua was named 
Mao's successor. Hua's greatest political triumph was 
getting rid of the Gang of Four; this action elevated him to 
Chairman of the party in autumn of 1976. He immediately 
attempted to institute moderate programs, re-establish the 
educational system and reinstate intellectuals to their 
previous positions. He began to lose power to his eventual 
successor, Deng Xiaoping, as a result of his failed Ten Year
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Plan.
7. Jiang Qing, M a o ’s wife and member of the Gang of Four, 
assisted Mao with the initiation of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution. She led the first assault against 
Western music, fashion and other cultural influences. In 
197 6 she was tried as a member of the Gang of Four and found 
guilty of conspiracy.
8. Ji Dengkui was the Commissar of the Beijing region.
Like Chen Xilian, he was removed by anti-leftists in autumn
1978.
9. Lin Biao replaced Peng Dehuai as Defence Minister in 
1959. This move was Mao's attempt to politicize the PLA and 
make it his power base in the Cultural Revolution. Lin was 
Mao's chosen successor until his over ambitious attempt to 
assassinate Mao in 1971 was discovered. His demise came 
about as a result of a plane crash while trying to flee the 
country for refuge in the Soviet Union.
10. Liu Shaoqi was one of five members of the Standing 
Committee of the CCP Politburo in 1949. Ten years later, Liu 
took the position of Chairman of the People's Republic, which 
was a governmental post. In the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, he was Mao's main political rival because he 
supported a more pragmatic approach to Chinese politics. He 
was purged by Mao at the end of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution in 1969. After his death Liu was 
readmitted to the Communist Party and his purge was
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denounced.
11. Lu Dingyi was a top party official and was most famous 
for his speeches which inspired the Hundred Flower's 
Campaign. He supported and encouraged intellectuals to 
express themselves freely in the campaign.
12. Mao Zedong was China's most notable political figure. 
He was one of the founding members of the Chinese Communist 
Party and was party Chairman from the revolution in 1948 to 
his death in 1976. Mao was the one of the most noted leaders 
during the Revolution. He ascended to top the party position 
after the revolution because of his strong leadership. Mao 
was committed to orchestrating China on a path to his version 
of communism. He was a ruthless leader who purged anyone who 
oppossed his ideology, especially during the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Red Gurard, groups 
sanctioned by Mao, were responsible for purging the majority 
of those who were accussed of having Wester-bourgeois ideals. 
Among his other political campaigns were the Great Leap 
Forward, which was an attempt to industrialize China and be 
competitive in the world economy; the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign, which was an attempt to incorporate intellectuals 
into the communist system. Using the campaigns as a 
political vehicle, Mao attempted to implement his ideology in 
the CCP and the government which permeated Chinese society. 
His political philosophy was published in small red covered 
books. These books were carried by millions of Chinese
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supposedly to give them guidance from their Chairman. Near 
the end of his life Mao was concerned that his vision of 
revolution would not be carried out to its end; he became 
increasingly concerned that his legacy would perish when he 
died. In part, his suspicions were true because soon after 
his death a power struggle ensued and the moderates 
eventually assumed control of the party.
13. Peng Dehuai was a veteran revolutionary who had played 
a major role in the formation of the Red Army. He rose 
through the military to attain the position of Minister of 
Defense. He lead an attack on the policies of the Great Leap 
Forward. Peng condemned communization, the collapse of 
national planning, the alienation of the party from the 
masses And the oppressive economic conditions and political 
practices, all of which he attributed to the "petty bourgeois 
fanaticism" of Maoists. For his outspokenness, Peng was 
subsequently purged at the outset of the Cultural Revolution.
14. Peng Zhen was an anti-Maoist and leader of the Beijing 
Communist Party. He criticized Mao for the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Mao purged him for 
obstructing the campaign and he is most famous for being the 
first political victim of the Cultural Revolution.
15. Qi Benyu, similar to Guan Feng, was a member of the 
Cultural Revolution Group and the May 16 Group, met the same 
political fate by being purged in the late autumn of 1969.
16. Wang Dongxing controlled the secret police in
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Shanghai. He is most famous for arresting the Gang of Four 
in 197 6 after Mao's death. Also, he ws the gead of the 
security establishment, and led the so-called "whatever 
faction" after Mao's death. He was subsequently purged by 
Deng Xiaoping for having remote ties to the Maoists.
17. Wang Hongwen was the leader of the Revolutionary 
Revolt of Shanghai Workers. This group was created by 
Shanghai workers and had no affiliations with the party or 
the government. They proclaimed loyalty to Mao and the 
movement but interpreted Maoist principles to suit their own 
needs. Wang formed an alliance with Zhang Chunqiao to 
incorporate the workers into the Cultural Revolution. He 
eventually became a member of the party's ruling Standing 
Committee of the Politburo with Zhang. His most famous role 
in the Cultural Revolution was as a member of the Gang of 
Four.
18. Wang Li, ultra-leftist, member of the Cultural 
Revolution Group and radical intellectual reached his 
political peak in 1967 when the ultra-leftists appeared to be 
gaining political ground. This was short lived, however, 
because he was accused of being a counter-revolutionary and 
was purged from the movement.
19. Wu Han, party official and historian, was the author of 
the play "Hai Jui Dismissed From Office." This criticized 
Mao's removal of Peng Dehuai after he opposed The Great Leap 
Forward. The play would become the impetus for Mao to
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challenge the loyalty of party members.
20. Zhang Chunqiao was the secretary of the Shanghai 
Party Committee until he replaced Chen Boda as the leader of 
the Cultural Revolution Group. He was responsible for 
incorporating the workers of Shanghai into the Cultural 
Revolution. He believed that the workers could replace the 
corrupt managers and run the factories using Maoist thought 
as a guideline. Zhang developed the Shanghai commune to 
follow Mao’s model for communist society. The commune failed 
and Zhang was forced to explain this to the people of 
Shanghai. He was promoted to the party’s Standing Committee 
of the Politburo after the fall of Lin Biao. He finally 
became Second Vice Premier of the party to Deng Xiaoping but 
was never appointed to the Premiership.
21. Zhao Ziyang, chosen by Deng Xiaoping to be Premier of 
the State Council in September of 1980, marking the beginning 
of a new generation of leaders for the Chinese Communist 
Party. Zhao was one of the first non-Long March era members 
to attain such a lofty party position.
22. Zhou Enlai was appointed Premier of the State Council 
by Mao in 1949. He provided much of the continuity and 
stability to the civilian state structure. Zhou was one of 
M ao’s oldest and most trusted comrades. Politically, he was 
a moderate who tried to hold the government together and had 
no further party ambitions.
Appendix B
The Chinese Communist Party and Government.
Although the party and government have similar 
structures, this appendix will illustrate the 
differences between the two. Often individuals will
serve in government and party posts simultaneously. The
outline of the party and government will be presented to 
depict the individual systems and their differences.
The Chinese Communist. Party
The party is divided into three basic levels, the 
center, province and city. Although each of the three 
has similar hierarchical structures, each is responsible 
for its individual jurisdiction. The central party is 
the ideological focus of the party formulating the 
official party line for all of the levels to follow.
The lower echelons of the party hierarchy report to
the upper levels and receive their directives from the 
higher tiers. This pattern is repeated throughout the 
three ranks; the central directs the province and the 
province guides the city. For example, higher party 
committees have the power to review officials elected by 
lower congresses and can assign leadership to lower 
levels without their approval. It should be noted that 
some city party organizations such as Beijing and
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Shanghai have more influence than other provincial 
structures namely Tibet Ixizangi and Heilongijiang 
because of their geographical locations and 
demographics.
The most important party body is the representative 
congress. All the leading members who form the 
committees that carry out the actual functions of the 
party belong to this assembly. The members are sent by 
their regions to attend the National Party Congress 
which convenes every five years. (Pursuant to the party 
constitution, the congress may convene earlier or later 
than the designated five years if required.)
The Central Committee acts for the Congress and is 
its most important representative body. The Central 
Committee is identified by the number of the congress 
that elected it, with its full meeting known as plenums 
which are held on an annual basis.
While the Congress is not in session, the daily 
functions are carried out by its Standing Committee, the 
Politburo and the Secretaries. In reality, it is the 
committees that run the party; the committee members 
have little control over the proceedings and simply 
ratify the committees' directives, lending legitimacy to 
decisions. The agenda and nominations for offices are 
controlled by the Standing Committee of the Congress 
Presidium which is elected by the congressional
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delegates on the day before the congress convenes.
During the session, delegates devote most of their time 
to small groups discussing leadership reports and 
candidate lists for the Central Committee, the 
Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Advisory 
Committee and other smaller Committees.
The Central Committee acts for the Congress and is 
its most important representative body. The Central 
Committee is identified by the number of the congress 
that elected it, with its full meeting known as plenums 
which are held on an annual basis.
The party leadership is provided by the 
Secretariat, the Politburo, its Standing Committee and 
the General Secretary. These posts are elected by the 
Central Committee; the General Secretary presides over 
the Central Committee, the Politburo and its Standing 
Committee. Until Hu Yaobang succeeded Hua Guofeng in 
1981, the General Secretary was known as the Party 
Chairman.
The Standing Committee is comprised of members who 
chair various Commissions such as the Military 
Commission. The Politburo and its Standing Committee 
are the highest decision makers.
The Secretariat is responsible for administering 
detailed work of the party which would be impossible for 
the Congress as a whole to undertake. Nine members
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constitute the Secretariat, they delegate tasks to lower 
party departments. Through this bureaucracy, the 
Politburo controls the execution of daily assignments 
from the central level down to the basic party groups 
established in every unit of Chinese society.
The party has. a similar structure throughout its 
levels. The majority of public policy was formulated in 
the Central Committee of the Party Congress. During the 
Cultural Revolution, Mao unrivaled leader of the party 
and the sole dictator of China.
The state Structure
The party is mirrored by its counterpart the State. 
The major function of the government is to lend 
legitimacy to the party directives, and to administer 
party policy through the bureaucracy. This section of 
the appendix will illustrate the governmental system 
focusing on the National People's Congress and its 
divisions as outlined in the State Constitution of 1982.
China has a unified state organization that 
includes four major hierarchies: the people's congress 
system, the government, the courts and the 
procuratorate. The people's congresses are 
representative assemblies meeting once a year. The 
government, from the state council to local
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administrators, is the executive and administrative 
bureaucracy of the state. Typically, its highest 
officials are elected by the people's congress at each 
level. Officials of the two legal hierarchies, the 
judiciary and the procuracy, are also elected by the 
people's congress.
Similar to the party structure, the State has its 
own National People's Congress which meets to discuss 
and approve work reports, the state plan, legislative 
drafts and, during the first session of its term, elect 
the major officials of government. It is comprised of 
approximately 3,000 delegates who meet once a year for a 
five-year term. Delegates are elected by provincial- 
level people's congresses, the same as in the Party 
Congress. There are six permanent committees: 
minorities, law finance, foreign affairs, overseas 
Chinese, and one responsible for education, science, 
culture and health. A presidium with a standing 
committee presides over the sessions and controls the 
agenda, the routing of legislation,and nominations for 
offices. The congress gives legitimacy and a popular 
base, rather than to chart the political course of the 
country which is the party's responsibility.
The majority of the government's power resides with 
the standing committee of the National People's Congress 
with fewer than 200 members, meeting every two months.
The group that heads this council and controls the 
government's agenda is the chair committee, 
incorporating the chairman of the standing committee, 
the vice-chairman, the secretary and a total of twenty- 
two members. The standing committee delegates issues to 
subcommittees that are active in coordinating 
legislation between different governmental organs and in 
communicating with provincial governments and standing 
committees. Interlevel contact is encouraged by 
allowing the leadership of provincial standing 
committees to attend meetings of the National People's 
Congress standing committee.139
139The information for the structure of the party 
and government was obtained from Townsend and Womack, 82- 
151.
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